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Calvin's View of Man: A Psychological Commentary
By Paul W. Pruyser

"The regeneration of willing, which is perhaps the most crucial concept in his [Calvin's] doctrine of man, is a complicated affair which requires an intricate psychological theory.... For the will to be regenerated much more is needed than an infusion of new power (perhaps from a new power source), or the furnishing of more suitable objects, or a better and wiser law, or any process of molding or curbing. What is required is a replacement of the 'me' as an action center. For even if I will the good, even if I will God, the seducing power of the 'I who wills so lofty a thing remains. The trouble with the ideas of self realization and self-actualization from a Calvinistic perspective is that they are self-propelled activities emanating from a center called 'I or 'Self.' They imply continuity of Self in the process of time, whereas the Calvinist (and in the wider sense all Christians) demand a discontinuity of self."

The first thing that man has to learn about himself, according to Calvin, is his inclination to paint his own image in rosy colors. Calvin tells us right from the start that we are less excellent than we could have been, despite the fact that we have our noble qualities," that we are above the animals in status and that

Paul W. Pruyser is the Director of the Department of Education at the Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas. Born in The Netherlands, he was educated both in Holland and in the United States. He took his doctorate in psychology at Boston University. He is the author of A Dynamic Psychology of Religion (1968). Dr. Pruyser has requested that this article be dedicated to his long-time friend and associate, Seward Hiltner, on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, November 26, 1909.

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we are made in God's image. Though it cannot be denied that man has reason and intelligence, and that he is destined to a "blessed immortality," any realistic assessment of ourselves would have to start with the assertion that our very reason and intelligence induce us to feel dissatisfied with ourselves. Thus the immediate impression of man is one of grandeur and misery. Man cannot be adequately described in unitary terms; he is always a duality of sorts.

I

There is a noxious element at work in man which throws some basic machinery out of gear, producing a pervasive discoordination, disorientation and a loss of proper identity. Like a drunk, his language has become garbled, his thoughts loose and mixed up, his gait unsteady, and his awareness of reality dim; he constantly misses the mark, especially by over-shooting it. But he always tries to offer some high-sounding reasons for his failures, sometimes with drooping sentimentality, sometimes with uninhibited aggressiveness. And the tragic fact is that he has no trouble finding comrades who will declare themselves brothers and bedfellows in this sort of profundity.

This is, of course, the so-called "depravity" of man's nature produced by the fall. But note that this fall is not something to be contemplated with melancholy, as an unfortunate happening which once befell Adam. The fall is not to be seen as an accident! It was self-produced by an ambitious deed, an insurrection, an act of arrogance, a proud aspiring to equality with God. Hence one of Calvin's keenest observations is that though the fall has been an historical event, its paradoxical consequence lies in the repetition of the deed which anteceded it. The act of insurrection is repeated by everyone in every generation, without exception. We do not merely share in Adam's fate and its aftermath; modern man actively repeats the deed of which the fall was a result.

Therefore it is perhaps much better to say that man is falling and perpetually ascending to fall, than simply that he has fallen. Calvin's twofold view of man requires the use of active verbs in the present tense.¹ It is as important to stress the positive qualities as it is to emphasize the negative ones. "The pious heart perceives a

¹ See also the Thirty-Nine Articles (1563), which notes that "original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk)."

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division in itself."² Calvin, in his writings, was a moral realist with penetrating insight into the deceit and the perniciousness of man, but he was also a good sixteenth century humanist with respect for man's grandeur. Moreover, he was a good observer of individual and cultural differences.

He states without shyness that man is the crown of nature, which is made for his use. Moreover, man's active rebellion against his Maker also implies that he is not a weakling, no meek and dependent entity, but a bundle of strength and arrogant activity. We have an interesting historical paradox here in that, in the works of Erasmus, the humanist, the weaker and baser side of human nature is satirized with biting humor; in the works of Calvin, the theist, and the advocate of total depravity, there is a hardly concealed respect for the formidable side of human nature. In his preface to Olivetan's New Testament he calls man "God's masterpiece,³ I who despite his fallen state is deemed worthy of God's promises.

It is impossible to read Calvin's works without feeling that one is being put back in one's place, but it is equally impossible to read them without receiving a tremendous boost to one's ego. One is made to feel both peeved and thrilled.

I take these various pairs of opposites to mean that man is a battlefield of forces, a unity with inner conflict. Calvin's portrayal of life is always sensitive to this inner state of turmoil, of which he registers all sorts of fluctuations. To put this in modern psychological terms, man is for Calvin a being in a state of tension, a dynamic system in an unstable equilibrium.

The arrangements between the creature and his Maker give to the Self a fleeting, uncertain, and quite subordinate status in Calvin's thought. Because the importance of feeling is generally not dealt with, the direct feeling of self as an emotional and valued substratum or center of personality is minimized. In its place there is a strong emphasis on will, action, and conscientiousness, leading to obedience or disobedience as the chief referents of self-experience. Calvin tries to prevent the search for salvation from becoming a form of self-enhancement or self-development in which case it would be an egocentric goal. For Calvin, the purest self is the theocentric self

² Institutes of the Christian Religion. Trans. by H. Beveridge. London, James Clarke & Co., 1953. III. 2. 18.
³ Commentaries, Vol. 23, Library of Christian Classics, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1958, p. 58.

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subordinate to God's sovereignty, with a distinct coloring of self-abasement yet without low self-esteem.

One could argue that such a self would have the earmark of masochism; it would be a self that seems out to destroy itself, or that seizes opportunities of being destroyed. The objection looses its ground when it is understood that masochism, like sadism, wells up from a powerful aggressive urge, and that Calvin's self-abasement is not a product of visceral needs at all, and certainly not aggression. Rather, it is the free response of the creature standing vis-à-vis his omnipotent Maker and acknowledging him as the greater of the two, not out of a need to please, or a desire to win love, but as a simple act of recognition and intellectual honesty. This act may be comparable to the psychoanalytic concept of "insight" (Kairos), a sudden reorganization of relations or a restructuring of pattern which corrects a previous and false interpretation of reality. It is painful and liberating at the same time, but pain is often a "fear of fear" which is later seen as transient and leading to a true deliverance. How dialectical Calvin's view of man and his experiences is, is indicated by his statement: ". . . there is nothing inconsistent in believers being afraid, and at the same time possessing secure consolations.⁴

II

The Christian self is realized through obedience to and faith in a transcendent Person. The Christian self is not a product of individuation but of confrontation, the confrontation between man and Maker. It is not achieved through identification, imitation, or introjections. It is not achieved at all, but given in the way that the world and its objects are given to our perception when we look out of the window when the sun comes up. It comes as a response to a stimulus. The process requires an infusion from elsewhere as an added motivation of enormous force and urge. In a system like Calvin's which takes the absolute causality of God as axiomatic, the whole problem of motivation takes on an external character, and the self tends to achieve a degree of vicariousness. At the height of human decision, in the privacy of choice, in the fullest consciousness of action, the Christian self is supposed to say: "Not I" Renewal of self, but not self-renewal, is the crucial experience.

⁴ Institutes, III. 2. 23.

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Justification by faith presupposes also a dialectic approach to morality in thought and action. Good works do not justify a man before God, laudable as his efforts may seem from a civic point of view and glorious as the achievement might seem from a developmental point of view. It belongs to the dialectic of goodness in the good man not to ascribe his goodness to himself, for in that case it is not goodness alone, but pride and vanity which co-determine his acts. It must always be attributed to another one, or rather to an interpersonal relationship in which goodness can come about and of which one finds himself largely the beneficiary. Though the most important interpersonal relationship is the vertical one between man and God, the horizontal relations between man and man are not to be minimized. The role of Monica in Augustine's life is one example, but ultimately, it is the indwelling "Other," Christ or the Holy Spirit to whom one responds in the encounters with one's fellowman.

The problem of motivation is thus very complicated. Though Calvin lived too early to differentiate between conscious and unconscious motives, there is much in his writings that suggests an awareness of different strata or sources of motivation. There is certainly a stratification of motives with the rational motive of willing at the top. But let us first consider some of the less rational motives.

Calvin wrote extensively about sexuality. Affirming the priesthood of all believers and taking exception to the Roman institution of celibacy, he was forced to be explicit on the subject. And his attitude seems rather realistic. He considers sex and marriage facts of creation which man should not tinker with, scorn, or degrade. Sex is inherently also a dignified fact-"it is not good that the man should be alone." There is no virtue in abstinence by itself; all one can say in favor of it is that abstinence could free time for more divine preoccupations. But perhaps even more indicative of Calvin's positive attitude toward sexual motives is his advocacy of strictly equal rights between the two sexual partners. Both coitus and abstinence require the mutual consent of the spouses, so that sex can indeed become the dignified act it is meant to be.

Yet there is another side to Calvin's realism and frankness in sexual matters. In his commentary on the Deuteronomy institutions, he vigorously applauds the harsh treatments meted out to

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people who are found to commit pervert sexual activities. His anger is aroused disproportionately by contemplating homosexuality, sodomy, and other perversions, indeed so much so that one cannot help wondering whether an inordinate fear of such abnormalities does not lie at the bottom of his rage. He condemns them as distortions of nature, but his view of nature seems in this instance more idealistic than realistic. Perhaps one could say that his appreciation of the primordial side of human nature is stained by a good deal of awe and fear of its formidableness. Man's grandeur as well as his misery have an aura of greatness, momentum, and almost terrifying consequentialness for Calvin. Hence man's sinful aberrations cannot be handled by a casual criticism or by disdain; they arouse a holy anger which is laden with respect for the greatness of the enemy.

This feature of awe and respect for the greatness of man in his virtues and his vices is essential for the appreciation of Calvin's view of man. To be made in God's image means for Calvin to be strong, robust, daring, insisting, commanding, a center of power. Insurrection is not for the weakling, nor can obedience be equated with a natural willingness and pleasing disposition. Faith, obedience, and the acceptance of grace go against the grain of man; he is not a ready receptacle for the Holy Spirit. Hence Calvin does not feel that he demands too much when he proclaims a faith that keeps the individual perpetually in unresolved tension. Inner conflict is of the essence of man, and Calvin apparently assumes that human beings have been constructed with a good deal of tension tolerance. Calvinism is not a wonder drug, certainly not a tranquilizer. Human nature is disquietude at bottom, for passing rages, anxiety itches, and guilt feelings sting; the self is adorable enough to be worshipped and vile enough to be despised and annihilated.

III

One might call this an anthropological realism, a viewpoint which accepts some basic functional polarities in man and conceptualized them as a network of lines of conflict. Unlike the purely hedonic approach, conflicts are not to be avoided, but recognized. If a man is naive, it is because he is avoiding his human responsibilities of thinking, feeling, willing, and evaluating. Anxiety should be faced for it can have a positively motivating effect. When it is "produced by a consciousness of our calamitous condition" it can stimulate us

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to place all our confidence and assurance in the Lord. Avoidance behavior is a way of depriving ourselves of much needed internal and external stimuli; yet reality is there, and it is the indispensable factor in education.

From here to Freud's famous statement, "The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing,"⁵ is not a great step. Whether we formulate it as instinct, need, drive or "humanly appetites" which "lay hold of us like powerful beasts and drag us to the things that give us pleasure,"⁶ or whatever, the urge of knowing and the development of cognitive control are paramount factors in Calvin's picture of man, as they are in Freud's psychology. Loyalty to the real and unadulterated inner and outer world, complete with its chaos and potential order, with its multiple conflicts and its ceaseless demands, is the sine qua non for man's development according to Freud, and for his rectitude according to Calvin. And large looms the need in both men to strive for an expanding view of reality; incessant corrections of the reality picture thus far held are absolutely necessary. Reality is not a simple, natural given, but must be discovered and captured. And the discovery, perpetually repeated, unsettles all comfortable equilibria.

For all the differences among them, one of the remarkable parallels in Freud and Calvin is that both men would subscribe to the statement that purity of thought is purity of heart. And note that for both men the statement remains valid when the sequence is reversed. Man's life, phylogenetically and ontogenetically, begins with a cognitive premise and a basic statement about his passion. Man starts with false thoughts, which come to him so naturally that Freud called it the "primary process"; man also starts with a self directed passion, to which Freud gave the name Narcissism. Calvin and Freud agree wholeheartedly that the false thought and the presumptuous passion remain very active throughout life.

IV

In debates between philosophers, religionists, and scientists there is probably no more controversial topic than that of freedom. The circumstance that controversies over freedom have an ancient lineage, and continue from one era into another with unabated vigor,

⁵ Freud, Sigmund, The Future of an Illusion. (In Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 21. London, Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 53).
⁶ Commentaries, p. 167.

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provides a hint that freedom seems a matter of opinion rather than fact. Some call freedom the essence of man; others feel that freedom is little more than a persistent illusion in man. Feelings run high even over the amount of freedom (if freedom can be put in quantitative terms) that one shall attribute to human beings. And no less heat is generated over the problem of the types or kinds of freedom that people have, should have, or should aspire to.

Calvin's treatment of freedom in man is no exception. While speaking of it, he is engaged in a lively debate with all kinds of real or imaginary adversaries in relation to whose position he attempts to find one that suits him. But he is also psychologically-minded enough to realize that one's academic or theoretical pronouncements about freedom tend to have the arousal effect of a political manifesto, the sedative effect of a sleeping pill, or the seductive effect of a tempting mistress. In other words, he speaks on freedom not only as a curious theoretician but also as a teacher and preacher, knowing full well that in the image of man the presence or absence of freedom does not only make the portrayal more or less veridical, but also more or less lively. Some pictures can be as alive as the picture of Dorian Gray, judging, accusing, enticing, pointing, proclaiming, or warning.

Calvin anticipated that liberty, if granted, may serve to some as a pretext to shake off obedience and therefore easily lead to licentiousness. On the other hand, if liberty is not granted a place in the dynamics of man, some will rise in indignation over the absence of choice, which they thought they had and which they would like to preserve. Audiences on freedom rarely behave as good listeners; they are highly reactive and can be led to stampeding.

I think there is considerable wisdom in Calvin's awareness of the possible effects of statements about freedom. Yet I cannot abstain from calling attention to a curious assumption for a theologian to make, which must underlie this sagacity. It is that freedom, in the ordinary sense for the ordinary man, is responded to in terms of "having" rather than "being." It is apparently thought that freedom is like an article, a possession, a prerogative, or a license which one either has or has not, and which one accordingly feels deprived and envious of, or enriched by. And as a consequence there may be use or abuse of this possession. On this line of thought, freedom is regarded as a gift which is inherited, acquired, or attracted, but at

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all times anxiously guarded as if one could lose it! For something so basic as freedom or servitude, which touches so closely upon the essence of man, one would expect a more existential approach. Calvin does offer such an approach, I think, but with a concomitant awareness of the perversion of freedom or unfreedom at the level of "having."

Calvin, then, dealt with freedom and its vicissitudes, including its perversions, much as Freud did with the sexual instinct in man. He also dealt with different kinds of freedom, such as Christian liberty and civil liberty, freedom of choice and freedom of will; with the natural history of freedom in man and the role of freedom in man's future development and destiny. Because of the magnitude of this program it might be helpful if we could place Calvin's views in the context of a systematic framework of expressed attitudes toward freedom.

V

In The Idea of Freedom, Mortimer J. Adler⁷ distinguishes three ways in which various authors have dealt with the problem of freedom. Freedom can be seen as: (1) circumstantial, i.e., dependent upon certain favorable circumstances such as money, social status, etc.; (2) acquired, i.e., dependent upon the acquisition of a certain state of mind or character; (3) natural, i.e., possessed by all men innately. He suggests that Calvin stressed freedom as something to be acquired. Adler also indicates that with each type of freedom goes a special view of the self: (1) circumstantial freedom invites to self-realization; (2) Acquired freedom invites to self-perfection; (3) Natural freedom invites to self-determination.

The following table further illustrates the types of freedom:

⁷ Adler, M. J., The Idea of Freedom. 2 vols. Garden City, Doubleday & Co., Vol. 1, 1958; Vol. II, 1961.

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According to this scheme one can compare and contrast a few noteworthy authors:

A glance at just about any place in the Institutes will tell us that Calvin expects man to aim at self-perfection. At first sight, then, Adler seems quite right in putting forth Calvin's emphasis on acquired freedom. Man has a goal and a task in life, namely to acquire that state of freedom in which he can be said to possess the good, the true, and the right. It is the task of rectitude, measured by the absolute standard of God's righteousness.

Adler seems also right in elucidating Calvin's affirmative position in regard to man's natural freedom. For despite all his qualifications and restrictions, Calvin asserts over and over that all man's natural gifts, though derailed and corrupted, are not destroyed. Surely man has the liberty to determine his course in life. In politics, economy, the mechanical arts, and in liberal studies man's intelligence shines forth and his will helps to effectuate some options and choices.⁸ The trouble is, however, that these things form only part of man's situation, namely what Calvin calls the "inferior objects."⁹ Over and against these inferior objects stand the superior ones which comprise three headings:

1. knowledge of God,

2. knowledge of His paternal favor toward us,

3. knowledge about how to regulate our conduct accordingly.

In other words, in recognizing two different realms of objects, there are in Calvin's image of man also two different perspectives of freedom, for to him freedom and its objects are bound together. This is the first weighty complication, comprising a pair of opposites, for free as man may be for inferior things, he is absolutely unfree in regard to superior things.

A second complication arises from Calvin's ideas of the "law of the flesh." While this law operates in the same realm in which natu-

⁸ Institutes, IL 2. 13-17.
⁹ Ibid., II. 2. 13.

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ral freedom can deploy itself, it posits a hindrance to the achievement of man's destiny, which is to enjoy the acquired freedom in which self-perfection can be obtained. The conscience which operates in natural man discerns between just and unjust, but God's justice is of a very different order. Self-determination (from natural freedom) can stand in the way of self-perfection (acquired freedom). Whereas this pair need not be incompatible in a humanistic conception of life, self-perfection and self-determination are almost opposites in a theistic scheme which stresses the creatureliness of man.

There is a third complication. Each freedom can be defined positively as well as negatively; there is a freedom "from" and a freedom "unto." When this distinction is applied to the two types of freedom which Calvin grants to man, we arrive at four cardinal situations, to be described in the next sections.

VI

1. Natural freedom "from"-

Under this heading, Calvin advanced the good psychological insight that fear limits the exercise of freedom. An example is a weakness under the impact of fear which "puts out even the sparks of right feeling."¹⁰ I In this category also falls freedom from compulsion, a subject that was too close to Calvin's heart. Although he describes this predominantly in relation to the ritualistic observance of religious laws, he is also open to man's tendency to become enslaved to fashion in dress, to submit to fads in choice of foods, and to follow socially approved manners. All these things have multiple alternatives from which a man with natural reason could choose; yet compulsions abound in this area and further restrict the use of an already perverted natural freedom.

In this context Calvin makes the very interesting remark that indifferent things must be used indifferently. One should be free from longing for them too hotly, from boasting about them, and from pursuing them too eagerly. An attitude should be related to the nature, i.e., the value, of its object. Not all concerns are ultimate concerns, and some concerns would be better reduced to unconcern. I think he highlights here a kind of freedom that is similar to the freedom from worry, fear, or apprehension that is part

¹⁰ Commentaries, p. 324.

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of all good mental hygiene ideals. Since concern with such "indifferent things" amounts to idolatry, one may assume that Calvin had an intuitive foreknowledge of the modern concept of displacement, whereby one object may be treated as a substitute for another. Numinous values may shift from divine to secular objects, and that is exactly what makes the latter idols. The contemporary psychologist knows that, in the unconscious, material objects and ideas stand for persons, whom one loves or hates.

2. Natural freedom "unto"-

Here man's discernment in regard to the "inferior objects" can be placed. Calvin's natural men, or at least some of them, are proud and humanistic enough to admit that one can, with the proper endowment and breeding, make excellent choices in favor of what is culturally rich, advantageous, or worthwhile. Man has a harder time in regard to moral choices, but even here it is possible to exercise certain natural liberties, as for instance, a wise, aristocratic set of political rulers might do. But the emphasis is to be placed on the group-character of this achievement, for Calvin thoroughly distrusts the capacity of the single ruler, such as a prince or monarch, to make the right choices with some semblance of persistence.

3. Acquired freedom "from"-

The self-perfection which comes with acquired freedom is negatively related to all that is comprised under the headings "sin" and "depravity." Acquired freedom "from" is first of all freedom from enslavement to the law of the flesh, even while this contains some natural freedom. "Where lust reigns, and therefore where the flesh rules, there the liberty of Christ has no place whatsoever."¹¹ It is a freedom from bondage to the "inferior" and "external" things. But is also a freedom from new possibilities of bondage to higher things. Believers should have the freedom from ceremonies of the Law.¹² They should also have the freedom from an oppressive and punitive conscience. Christian liberty (which is what Calvin's acquired freedom concretely means) is meant to "give peace to trembling consciences."¹³ The man with acquired freedom is able to accept gifts; he does not become an obsessive doubter; he does not

¹¹. Comm. Patri Apostoli Epistolem Post., 2: 19.
¹² Commentaries, p. 324.
¹³ Institutes, 111. 19. 3.

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suffer from scrupulosity. Calvin includes liberty itself as something that is to be used freely, without bondage to it. For instance, the spiritually free man need not display his acquired liberty by counter phobic acts such as eating meat on Friday.¹⁴

In all these examples and remarks it is clear that Calvin knew of the excessive rigor and unholy forcefulness of the superego. And without using that word to designate a part of the personality he also realized that it is an internal rather than an external force. The term "conscience," as defined by Calvin, exemplifies this awareness of interiorized force, inalienable from the person. It stands between God and man, "not suffering man to suppress what he knows in himself." It is "set over him as a kind of sentinel to observe and spy out all his secrets."¹⁵ And "the law, while binding the external act, leaves the conscience unbound."¹⁶

4. Acquired freedom "unto"-

Here, of course, we encounter everything that is related to salvation. Freedom "unto" in this sense is the freedom to accept God's gift of regarding us as righteous, despite our continued partial bondage to self-determination toward the wrong goals which is the part of natural freedom. We are here faced with true "open-endedness" in every respect. Consider the following statement: "Paul, though clearly made free, still groans and longs after perfect freedom."¹⁷ Thus, this acquired freedom remains always more or less a foretaste only of things yet to come, of a self yet to be perfected.

It is also noteworthy that this liberty (in Christ) has to be exercised. From the acquired freedom "unto" follow the real rules, duties, and works of the Christian. If we anxiously avoid the use of this gift, we offend the gift's Giver.¹⁸

Paradoxically this acquired freedom "unto" is also the highest, binding, because its essence is obedience, voluntary obedience to God's will. It should be practiced with cheerfulness,"¹⁹ and its scope should be determined by a loving vision of the plight of our brethren. Our use of it must not become a stumbling block for the weak. Expediency and edification co-determine the particular forms in

¹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁵ Institutes, Ill. 19. 15.
¹⁶ Ibid., III. 19. 16.
¹⁷ Comm. Evang. loann., 8: 32.
¹⁸ Institutes, III. 19. 13.
¹⁹ Ibid., III. 19. 2.

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which obedience to God's will is to be manifest.²⁰ One should avoid the two abuses of acquired freedom which Calvin describes with the words "the weak" and "the Pharisees." The weak are those who cannot make up their minds about anything (and who are thus unable to choose and see through what they chose); the Pharisees are those who seem to have made up their minds once for all and who are not perplexed by anything; these are the people who choose only once, and keep protecting that one choice legalistically and ritualistically. Their failure is that they do not choose repeatedly or not often enough. They foreclose the openness of the situation.

VII

Much more could be added under these various rubrics of freedom, particularly under the fourth heading which includes the whole path of salvation. But the essence has not yet been said. And that is that man, laboring under four polarities of freedom which concomitantly motivate him, rather than having just one clear and simple principle of liberty to guide his behavior, is perpetually exposed to serious conflict. His will, and the preconditions of willing such as discernment, reason, and choice, seem a multiheaded monster involved in a battle on several fronts.

There is the obvious bondage of the will to natural passions, but also the natural possibility to rise above passion in the pursuit of cultural values with a modicum of real freedom. And then there is, even in the regenerate, the inadequate functioning of a transformed will which continues to succumb to the rule of the flesh (which includes mind and heart as well), and the frightful distance of the ultimate goal of obedience, even when heartily willed and aspired. In addition, there is the absolute contradiction (from the theistic viewpoint' ) between man's tendency toward self-determination and the imposed demand for self-perfection, each of which has its realistic as well as its delusional possibilities.

I have expounded these views of Calvin at some length in order to show that the regeneration of willing, which is perhaps the most crucial concept in his doctrine of man, is a complicated affair which requires an intricate psychological theory.

Is man's essence achieved by the exercise of freedom, as Sartre has it? Does the mere possession of consciousness produce freedom,

²⁰ Ibid., III. 19. 3.

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as most naturalistic philosophers assume? Are the contemporary concepts of self-realization and self-actualization and their inherent assumptions about freedom indeed the kind of concepts that may form a bridge between the social sciences and theology?"²¹ And are they articulate enough to leave room for all the complicated motivations and goals which Calvin has observed in man?

It seems to me that on these issues Calvin is at times more realistic and more aware of complications than many well-meaning naturalists. He knows that willing can have many different objects, that it can derive energy from many different motives, and that it can be led by different intentions. Willing can be intended to the self and the non-self, to good and to evil, to assertion and to surrender. But the constant danger in all willing is that it heightens the awareness of the "I" who senses itself in the act of willing as an actor, as action center, power house, and sometimes as dictator. The psychological studies of the Wuerzburg school have indeed shown that there is no other process which places the feeling of "I" as central as the act of willing. Perceiving, sensing, thinking, and even desiring involve some balance between an outside object and me; the "me " is there but it is usually overtaken by the importance of the me object. In willing, however, there tends to be a supreme experience of the "me" who wills, including skeletal-muscular sets of the body.

Hence Calvin's wise proposal that the use of the term "free will" be abolished because it is a dangerous statement.²² Hence also his further step toward advising a complete overhaul of human willing. For the will to be regenerated much more is needed than an infusion of new power (perhaps from a new power source), or the furnishing of more suitable objects, or a better and wiser law, or any process of molding or curbing. What is required is a replacement of the "me" as an action center. For even if I will the good, even if I will God, the seducing power of the "I" who wills so lofty a thing remains. The trouble with the ideas of self-realization and self-actualization from a Calvinistic perspective is that they are self-propelled activities emanating from a center called "I" or "Self." They imply continuity of Self in the process of time, whereas the Calvinist (and in the wider sense all Christians) demand a discontinuity of self.

²¹ Pruyser, P. W., "The Freedom To Be Oneself," Pastoral Psychology, 16: 18-25, October 1965.
²² Institutes, II. 2. 8.

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Perhaps such a process can best be described by the term "depersonalization," taken in a special sense. It cannot be described by terms such as "enriching experience," "enlightenment," or "growth" unless the latter term includes step functions to replace the usual curves based on slow and fast increments. Theologically, we should also watch for confusion about the role of grace as added momentum or power. If grace is merely to be added to what I am already, when it is only to redirect my will, or when it only substitutes better values for the ones I now hold, I can only be all the more pleased with myself. Instead of my splendid solipsism, "another one" should come to live in me. There needs to be a radical relocation, a displacement of my position in the universe. The "I" has to be dethroned. What I need is not divine help (which could simply become another gadget for me), nor even divine guidance (because then I could still be a proud pupil of such a splendid teacher). What Calvin's man needs is to be "hollowed out" and to be refilled by Christ. With the dethroning of the "I," however, the "I's" images of its freedom (whether true or false) fall away. In their stead comes the total subordination of the human will to the will of God. All possible choices thereby become reduced to only two alternatives, namely God's will or man's will. Choosing the former has very little connection with the traditional sense of the word freedom, but one has the experience of doing good. Choosing the latter may recreate the illusion of freedom, but one suffers from having chosen the bad. Thus one loses quite a bit, either way.

For even the loftiest and most divine pursuits in man tend to come to nothing as long as they are directed from within. It is fine to have a conscience, but conscience is not enough. It is open to bribery. Anticipating Freud's technical demonstrations by several centuries, Calvin refers with approval to Themistius' statement that even the best conscience is apt to make a distinction between general essences and particulars. True, we all know that homicide is evil, and we will firmly assert the abstract principle, "Thou shalt not kill." But when we are faced with a bitter enemy, we deliberate his killing as if it were good. At the level of particulars we forget (or reconstrue) the rules of the general. And this is not simple forgetfulness, but it is due to our fascination for evil; we rush willfully and headlong into it.²³

²³ Ibid., II. 2. 23.

67 - Calvin's View of Man: A Psychological Commentary

VIII

At this point it is good to be aware of the precise meaning of the word "willing" in Calvin. He carefully fences it off from the more unconscious motives and the determining tendencies of nature:

"The power of free will is not to be considered in any of those desires which proceed more from instinct than mental deliberation ... There is no act of free will unless when reason looks at opposites. ... Appetite is not of the will, but natural inclination. "²⁴

This implies an important distinction also between freedom (of willing) and spontaneity (of action). There are phrases in Calvin's doctrine of man which seem to describe spontaneity while using the word freedom:

"Man sins not forced or unwilling, but voluntarily, by a most forward bias of the mind . . . not by violent compulsion or external force, but by the movement of his own passion."²⁵

If these forms of spontaneity, falsely labeled "freedom," are subtracted from Calvin's inventory on freedom, it is quite clear that little freedom is left. Through a process of quite effective reasoning, and at times shrewd psychological analysis, freedom has almost disappeared from the human picture.

All in all, then, Calvin's natural man has some semblance of freedom in choice and will, but this is too little and too shaky to deserve the name "free will." I think that at this level Calvin's man is close to the contemporary image of man drawn by psychologists. First, the acquired freedom to which man under divine guidance may aspire is in opposition to the tendency of natural willing. Second, it is never realized in life and seems more like a goal than a reality. Third, it is a kind of freedom which is also, or even primarily, a form of obedience. It is surrender of the will rather than assertion of the will. Not even choice is really free because it is all contingent upon extraneous arrangements.

Yet there is no reason whatever to despair over this situation. For one more thing remains to be said, and this may well turn out to be the "saving grace" for Calvin's doctrine of man in regard to freedom. That is the very definite link which Calvin establishes between freedom and love in God. The "proof" of God's freedom

²⁴ Ibid., II 2. 26.
²⁵ Ibid. II. 3. 5.

68 - Calvin's View of Man: A Psychological Commentary

lies in his demonstrations of love and kindness to some men, i.e., his elect. He freely chooses some, which he singles out for his love and favor, without any regard for the previous worth or dignity of the individual. God's choice has no reason but his love and freedom:

"One good pleasure of God is more than a thousand reasons."²⁶

In loving his elect, God constitutes his own freedom to the fullest extent. For election does not even depend upon God's foreknowledge about certain individuals!

In describing this perfect freedom of God in terms of loving, good pleasure, favor, and of course grace, Calvin offers a kind of model that may be used to clarify human freedom as well. This model suggests that the most pregnant and veridical form of freedom has to be sought in the act of loving. We cannot here develop an exhaustive phenomenology of the subjective situation "I love you." Some important aspects of it are immediately apparent to anyone who has had the experience of it. This situation includes ample choice and selection, election, and rejection; it involves freedom from compulsion and outer pressure. It hinges upon possibility rather than necessity. It involves spontaneity, voluntariness, "good pleasure," favor, and even grace in the dictionary sense of that word which is "beauty or harmony of attitude, ease, good will, kindness."

²⁶ Commentaries, P. 293.