118 - Freedom and the Moral Life: The Ethics of William James

Freedom and the Moral Life: The Ethics of William James
By John K. Roth
157 pp. Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1969. $5.00.

In the opening sections of this book, the author stresses the contemporary importance of James's ethics. It is claimed that James gives us sound guidelines regarding the function of freedom, and that he provides us with a framework for solving problems that are "very much a part of the present scene" (p. 14). The contemporary flavor of James is also claimed in his existential philosophy and situational ethics. The reader, then, is promised a great deal. He is basically promised a relevant and useful book. The promise is only partially kept.

The primary aim of the book is to present the ethics of James as a situational approach to decision-making. According to the author, a few writers have examined James's ethics but none has consistently developed the situational character of those ethics. Professor Roth attempts to do just that. His approach is not imposed on James's materials; it is, rather, found throughout them. Moreover, the situational ethics of James which Roth carefully spins out consistently avoids any charge of reductionistic

119 - Freedom and the Moral Life: The Ethics of William James

subjectivism, which seems to be a relief to the author who believes "we have moved too far in the direction of the subjective and the relative" (p. 17). James's situational ethics are the basis for stating an ethical norm which the author believes is consistent with James and yet goes beyond him. The aim of the book is really twofold: to present the situational ethics of William James and to present the author's ethical norm based on those ethics.

It is claimed that James's methodological wedge which splits the log of ethical absolutes is his understanding of consciousness. Consciousness is neither passive nor epiphenomenal. It is active. It is intentional. However, in its activity and intentionality it is selective with respect to what it attends. Consciousness is a selective force. To the degree that consciousness is a selective force, to that degree man has a creative role in determining meanings and values. Furthermore, to the extent that man has this creative role, to that extent ethical standards are created out of experience. In other words, the situation of consciousness precipitates situational ethics. The situation of consciousness renders ethical absolutes impossible.

Though characterized by selective inattention, consciousness does attend to some things, is involved in thinking, in. choosing, and in acting. It is important, therefore, to bring into consciousness those factors which can lead to responsible behavior. Consciousness must be properly educated, so that it becomes inquisitive, critical, sensitive to novelty. Through such a process, the capacities of consciousness and maximum freedom will develop and grow. Freedom and the selective powers of consciousness are correlated in James's ethics. Maximum freedom and a trained consciousness become central and interdependent foci at this point.

However, education of consciousness must also have the support of the community. A community which will maximize the freedom of consciousness is necessary . In this way, Professor Roth sees James relating situational ethics to normative issues. The freedom of the selective powers of consciousness requires the unity which personal and social community provide. It is then claimed that the basic ethical values in James's position are freedom and unity.

Roth does not see James going on from this point to state an adequate ethical norm. Roth finds James quite adequate in his exposition of the freedom which consciousness produces and in his appeal to the normative nature of the unity of community. But he finds James inadequate when he offers a quantitative ethical norm: Satisfy at all times as many demands as we can. Roth parts with James at this point because the latter offers no qualitative distinctions regarding priorities to be given to par-

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ticular demands. While Roth refuses to accept James's ethical norm, he believes that James's understanding of freedom and unity provides a basis for a more acceptable ethical norm: an existential norm (p. 111). While James does not develop such a norm, Roth finds his position open to it.

Roth formulates his own existential norm in the light of James's basic values: Act so as to maximize freedom and unity (p. 114). According to Roth, "This norm tells us that freedom and unity are the basic values that stand at the foundation of meaning. . . . If freedom is stressed at the expense of unity, chaos and frustration may appear. If unity is stressed at the expense of freedom, a beneficial variety and richness in experience may be lost" (p. 114). Only as one maximizes freedom and unity can meaning be communicated and preserved for future generations. This norm, however, always requires a situational approach. It does not give anv specific answers to a specific question, but it does, according to Roth, call attention to factors of primary importance that we must think about and reflect on in relation to concrete circumstances and problems we face" (p. 115). This existential norm is implicit in James's situational understanding of freedom and unity, and Roth finds it more adequate than James's own quantitative norm.

As Roth moved toward the end of his short book, he seemed to use the word "concrete" more frequently. No doubt he was keenly aware of his own words, "Good decisions cannot be made without a careful situational analysis" (p. 116). The existential norm can be best seen in concrete situations. That is what he seems to be saying near the end of his book. Unfortunately, Professor Roth never gives one concrete situation in which his existential norm is analyzed. Perhaps he unconsciously dabbles with this great weakness in his book by talking more and more about "concrete" situations and a "careful situational analysis" as he brings his work to a close. In any case, his promise to be relevant and useful fails to a great extent because he himself fails to get concrete. The book is still at the stage of arm-chair ethics. It is one thing to state principles; it is quite another thing to show how the dynamics of a principle operate in a concrete situation. Professor Roth does the former and avoids the latter.

This book is written well, although perhaps unnecessarily repetitious at a number of points. Its thesis regarding the ethics of William James is supported well, and Professor Roth is imaginative in departing from James along the way. The lack of an index is a negative feature. Perhaps the most striking feature about the book is its un-jamesean approach to Jamesean material; this reviewer is convinced that James would have included in the book some concrete cases for "careful situational analyses."

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In any case, the absence of concrete case analysis greatly weakens the presentation.

Coval B. MacDonald
Rice University
Houston, Texas