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Conversion And Christian Ethics
By James P. Hanigan

"The normative meaning of Christian conversion is to be found in a basic structure of human experience, involving the initiative of God's action and provoking a two - sided, inseparable response. This response involves the acknowledgment and confession of one's lostness and sinfulness as well as the acceptance of a call to holiness.... What this foundational conversion experience means for Christian ethics, I believe, is that the converted inevitably, will understand morality, differently, from the non - converted. "

CONVERSION is the foundational experience of Christian life and so of Christian ethics. What follows in this article attempts to explore this claim. The intent is to investigate what conversion entails rather than the processes or dynamics through which it may be elicited or invited. To express the matter somewhat differently, we will not be dealing here with how people are or may be converted, but with what it means to be converted in the Christian sense.

I

Conversion is, in the language of Charles Curran, "the central moral message of Jesus," ¹ and, consequently, the foundational experience of the Christian way of life. ² All the biblical symbols that point to the basic structure of the divine - human relationship or which suggest how one enters upon the Christian way of life make this clear ^.3 What is called for is a death and a rebirth, a turning away from the darkness to walk in the light, a putting off of the old self to put on the new a change of mind and

James P. Hanigan is Associate Professor of Moral Theology. Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pa. He received his doctorate from Duke University, and his articles have appeared in Horizons, American Ecclesiastical Review, Chicago Studies, and the Journal of Religious Thought. His book, What Are They Saying About Sexual Morality? has recently been published by Paulist Press.
¹ Charles E. Curran, "Conversion: The Central Moral Message of Jesus," A New Look at Christian Morality (Notre Dame: Fides, 1970), pp. 25 - 71.
² Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), pp. 15 - 53.
³ Jim Wallis, The Call to Conversion (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981 ), pp. 1 - 17; see especially the notes to chapter 1, pp. 170 - 174; and A. Hulsbosch, The Bible on Conversion (De Pere, Wisc: St. Norbert Abbey Press. 1966).

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heart so as to put on the mind of Christ, and so on. Conversion is a principle, then, in the literal sense of principium; it is a beginning on which all that follows is based. It is not, of course, an intellectual principle but an experimental one, which is why we can refer to it as the foundational experience of Christian ethics. The biblical symbolism can surely be multiplied at great length to confirm this initial point, but we can also explore this foundational experience in a more substantive way by using biblical examples of individuals who encounter the living God, or who are awakened to a consciousness of the presence of the presence of transcendent reality in their lives. I restrict myself here to three such examples, but there are certainly many others, an analysis of which would provide similar results.

(1) The prophet Isaiah gives us a dramatic account of his prophetic calling (Isa. 6:1 - 13). ⁴ The initial vision or experience of the prophet is one of the holiness and glory of Yahweh whose glory fills all the earth. This experience evokes the profound feelings of awe, reverence, and holy fear and immediately elicits from him the response of his own and his community's wretched and sinful state. "What a wretched state I am in! I am lost, for I am a man of unclean lips and I live among a people of unclean lips, and my eyes have looked at the King, Yahweh Sabbath" (6:5 b).

This insight, this awakening to a consciousness of his wretched condition is incomplete, however, for immediately a seraph flies to the prophet with a live coal taken from the altar of Yahweh. With it he touches the prophet's lips and says, "See now, this has touched your lips, your sin is taken away, your iniquity is purged" (7b), and with this purging comes Yahweh's question: "Whom shall I send" Who will be our messenger?" (8b). The prophet is emboldened to volunteer - dare he not? - "Here I am, send me" (9a). He is promptly sent; "Go and say to this people. . . ." (9b).

There is noticeable in this story a basic structure of an experience of the living God which, I suggest, begins to point us toward the normative meaning of conversion. There is first the unlooked for awakening to the presence of transcendent reality in the prophet's own life - not just an awareness of God, but God for him. This awakening provokes a new consciousness of both the divine and the human and their relationship. As an immediate consequence there is a reorientation of the self, a reorientation which is initially painful and unwelcome - it is not pleasant to recognize that one is lost, wretched and unclean - but which ends up in comfort and hope.

Both moments or sides of the experience, the death and rebirth are provoked not by any insight into or awareness of the self and its shortcomings and possibilities, nor by a reflection on the world and its problems. The experience follows upon Isaiah's awareness of the holiness of Yahweh. We might, by way of illustration, contrast the prophet's

⁴ All biblical citations are from The Jerusalem Bible.

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experience to the human experience of awakening to one's own limits, failures, and inadequacies or those of one's society in the light of either one's own ideals and values or the abilities, achievements, and social standing of others. For this latter experience the best answers our modern culture seem able to generate are either cries for revolution or some version of the therapeutic principle, "I'm okay, you're okay," whereas it was abundantly clear to Isaiah that none of us is okay at all.

(2) We find the same basic structure of experience in Peter's awakening to a consciousness of the presence of divine reality in his life as he encountered that presence in the person of Jesus. The experience is recounted for us in an especially clear way in Luke 5:1 - 11 and in less explicit fashion in Matt. 4:18 - 22. As Luke tells the story, it was the miraculous catch of fish that awakened Peter's consciousness to an awareness that there was more to Jesus than meets the eye. Peter found himself in the presence of someone or something which elicited from him that most natural of all gestures of awe, reverence, and holy fear - he fell on his knees. This gesture was accompanied by a confession of his own wretched condition: "Leave me, Lord; I am a sinful man" (5:9). Once again, however, this insight is incomplete. Immediately a new life, a new direction is held out to Peter. "Do not be afraid; from now on it is men you will catch" ( 11a). And Peter followed Jesus, leaving everything behind.

In this example of Peter, despite a rather different social setting and a different content of experience, we find a basic structure of experience that is readily recognizable as similar in meaning to Isaiah's experience. There is the unlooked for awakening to the presence of transcendent reality in his life, which provokes in him a new awareness of both the divine and the human and their relationship. There is the reorientation of the self which involves the initially painful acknowledgment of his own sinful condition but which terminates in comfort and hope. Neither moment of the experience is self - provided or self - initiated, but elicited by the encounter with the divine presence. There is, once again, considerably more involved here than taking stock of one's self and one's failures and possibilities, or of comparisons of the self with the abilities and achievements of others, or of honesty about one's deepest fears and aspirations. Despite the confession about himself, Peter, like Isaiah, is not self - focused but other - focused.

(3) As a third and final example we can detect the same basic structure of experience in Paul's conversion experience which is similar on the surface to Isaiah's in that it takes the form of a private vision. The account of Paul's experience can be found in Acts (9:1 - 19, 22:1 - 16, 26:12 - 23), and in a shortened form in Gal. 1: 11 - 24. For no particular reason, I follow here the account in Acts 9. ⁵ While on his mission of zeal

⁵ David Stanley, "Paul's Conversion in Acts: Why the Three Accounts"' Catholic Biblical Quarterily 15 (July 1953), pp. 315 - 338.

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to preserve the integrity of Judaism, Paul is surrounded by a light from heaven and falls to the ground. This time a voice other than his own makes not a confession but an accusation, "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me'?" (9:4). The voice then orders Paul to proceed to Damascus where he will be given further instructions. In Paul's case the experience initially leaves him blind and there is a three day wait before Ananias appears with the good news that he is to see again and be filled with the Holy Spirit. He eats, drinks, regains his strength, and after a few days begins to proclaim the Gospel.

Again there is the same structure of experience; the unlooked for awakening to the presence in his life of transcendent reality, a new awareness of the divine and the human and their relationship, a new orientation of the self that is initially painful but which terminates in comfort and hope.

I have elaborated these examples in some detail because I am concerned to illuminate as clearly as possible what I have repeatedly called a basic structure of experience. And it is that basic structure of experience that I wish to propose as normative for the meaning of Christian conversion. Obviously the three examples are portrayed biblically in a somewhat dramatic fashion and so suggest that the awakening of consciousness to the presence of transcendent reality in one's life is something abrupt, unlooked for, and well - marked. But that does not mean that there was no previous psychological and spiritual preparation for such experience nor that, if we had the biographies of our three exemplars, we would be unable to fit these experiences coherently into their lives. It does mean, however, that the awakening is experienced with a degree of serious intensity and sufficient newness that warrant calling it a conversion experience or describing it as a decisive event.⁶

We can understand events such as we have described as events of cognitive and psychological disequilibrium. ⁷ They involve a process of being thrown off balance - it is noteworthy, that both Peter and Paul fell down - and then restored to equilibrium on an entirely new basis, which requires considerable getting used to. One way, then, of describing the Christian way of life is as a gradual and complete change in the equilibrium of the self. ⁸ The attempt of Peter to walk upon the water (Matt. 14:22 - 33) serves as a useful biblical illustration of how difficult it is to establish this new equilibrium. Such an understanding also suggests why conversion is only a beginning of the Christian life, or if

⁶ Krister Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), pp. 7 - 23, is more impressed with the continuity of the before and after of Paul's experience than the difference and so prefers to describe the experience as a call rather than a conversion. I am in full agreement with his discussion, but will argue that call is an indispensable aspect of authentic conversion.
⁷ Walter E. Conn (ed.), Conversion: Perspectives on Personal and Social Transformation (New York: Alba House, 1978) is indispensable for exploring various dimensions of conversion that are outside the immediate interests of this essay.
⁸ Evelyn Underhill. Mysticism (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1961 ed.), pp. 176 - 177.

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one prefers, why conversion might also be understood as a continuous process in which we are likely to be thrown off balance more than once.

Understanding conversion as a process of disequilibrium and restoration to balance on a new basis is similar to the theoretical understanding of cognitive and moral development of psychologists like Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Both men see such development taking place as a result of a series of cognitive disequilibrium events and the persistent tendency of the human organism to seek equilibrium. ⁹ This way of looking at the matter helps us to understand why the simple experience of being knocked off balance is sufficient neither for conversion nor moral growth. For a person might well seek to restore equilibrium on the same old basis. It also makes clear why not just any change or new basis is sufficient for Christian conversion, since only faith in Christ can serve as the foundation for the Christian way of life, a fact which supports the claim for a normative conception of conversion.

But it is important to stress that the awakening of the consciousness of the human person to the presence of the God revealed in Christ results in a disturbance of the present equilibrium of the self. It disturbs the at - home - ness in my world which I have so carefully established for myself on my own terms. It reveals to me not only that I am lost or mistaken, but that I have no excuse to offer, no defense to make for being lost. If this painful condition is faced and acknowledged, it leads to the confession of one's wretched state or sinfulness. This confession, then, is the first normative element in the meaning of Christian conversion to explore for its ethical implications.

II

The popularity of Kohlberg's theory of moral development with its strongly Kantian understanding of morality, ¹⁰ and which, incidentally, is coming under increasing criticism from theologians, has familiarized most educators with stages of moral growth that lead the individual away from heteronomy toward autonomy. ¹¹ Such stage theory holds out as the goal of moral development the Enlightenment moral ideal of the fully autonomous human agent. My teaching experience with students is that they readily accept such an ideal, harbor a varying degree of self - doubt, guilt, and resentment toward authority figures - including God - because they have not yet realized the ideal, and generally interpret the ideal to mean that they are or should be accountable to no

⁹ For a popular treatment of Piaget and Kohlberg see Ronald Duska and Mariellen Whelan, Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (New York: Paulist Press, 1975). esp. p. 49. See also Craig R. Dykstra. "Transformation in Faith and Morals." THEOLOGY TODAY. XXXIX, I (April 1982). pp. 56 - 64.
¹⁰ Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development: Volume I, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981).
¹¹ See, e.g. Craig Dykstra, Vision and Character: A Christian Educator's Alternative to Kohlberg (New York: Paulist Press, 1981); Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 129 - 152: Paul J. Philibert, O.P., "Conscience: Developmental Perspectives from Rogers and Kohlberg," Horizons 6 (Spring 1979). pp. 1 - 25.

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one but themselves for their moral decisions. But if my depiction of conversion is at all accurate, such students have badly missed the mark. Autonomy in Kohlberg's sense is not a Christian ideal but an illusion and a rather subtle form of idolatry. What the awakening of consciousness to the presence of the God revealed in Christ makes explicitly clear, ethically, is that we are accountable to someone beyond our own consciences. We are called, and rightly called, to respond to a truth, a beauty, a goodness beyond our own making or imagining, and woe is me if I do not respond. ¹²

While it is, then, properly speaking, a religious conversion which stands at the foundation of the Christian way of life, such a conversion has also an inescapable ethical dimension. The religious conversion can be described accurately in the language of a Paul Tillich as being grasped by ultimate concern or with Bernard Lonergan as an otherworldly falling in love, ¹³ or in sundry other ways, but in any case Christian conversion involves also a demand for total, permanent self - surrender, without conditions, qualifications, or reservations. God is not some sentimental blob who does not care what we do, but rather the One who cares passionately and demands an accounting. The call to such surrender is not for an action but for a new dynamic orientation of the self that is logically prior to and the principle of all subsequent understandings and actions. While this new orientation can be explicated philosophically, as Lonergan does, as the undertow of existential consciousness, ¹⁴ or in terms of a fundamental option, ¹⁵ it can also be expressed in the language of Vatican II as the vocation to holiness ¹⁶ or in simple biblical terms as the call to discipleship. But it is precisely only over - against this call, this demand for response, that our confession and need for continual conversion find their meaning and possibility.

This experience or better, this aspect of the experience I am describing as conversion - does not seem to be what is generally understood as being born again, and it is certainly not the experience which answers Luther's question of where one will find a gracious God. ¹⁷ For while it includes the joyful acceptance of God's healing grace, it also involves facing up to and acknowledging both my own sinfulness and the demand of God that I be responsible.

Nevertheless, it is both beside the point and possibly dangerous to try to proclaim the central moral message of Jesus by pointing out to individuals or groups how sinful or wretched or wicked they are, or how

¹² The Catholic way of expressing that, in the words of Vatican Council II, is "within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself... Austin Flannery, O.P. (ed) "The Church in the Modern World," Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Collegeville, Minn: The Liturgical Press, 1975), 16. p. 916.
¹³ Bernard Lonergan. Method in Theology (New York: Seabury, Press. 1979), pp. 104 - 107.
¹⁴ Ibid., p. 140.
¹⁵ Franz Bockle, Fundamental Moral Theology (New York: Pueblo Publishing Company. 19801, pp. 105 - 112.
¹⁶ Flannery. "Lumen Gemium," 9 - 17, pp. 359 - 369.
¹⁷ Stendahl, pp. 12 - 13.

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far short they fall from Gospel ideals or commands, or by urging them to cultivate an excessively introspective conscience. ¹⁸ For the sinfulness-and the sins - for which we are asked to repent are not primarily illuminated by comparisons with other people, past or present, who seem more generous than ourselves, or by examining how short we fall from our own rules or ideals. Our lostness is made manifest in the face of the awesome holiness of God and "the harsh and dreadful love"¹⁹ revealed in Christ.

III

The other normative aspect of the conversion experience, beyond the confession of our sinful condition, is the call to holiness. the discipleship to which we are summoned which encompasses the more particular but inescapable ethical demands of Christian existence. There is something God wants us to be, calls us to be, and repentance and faith are both meaningless and impossible without the call to discipleship and holiness of life. Yet this call, while expressed here in general, abstract terms, is not itself abstract, but always concrete, rooted in a specific history and society with quite specific referents. Christian conversion always implies a community referent, a narrative referent, a rational referent, and a personal referent.

The community referent reminds us that Christian conversion entails church membership, that is, association with a normative community, not merely in a voluntary group that constructs its own norms and purposes, or in one that happens to be personally agreeable. God's call in Christ means that one is called to join the Church. Church membership, then is a moral duty, not an optional element or a utilitarian need. And the church, while sociologically understood as a voluntary association, is theologically a moral community to which one is called to belong and serve. To express the same notion differently, Christian conversion recognizes that we become God's children, members of his family. by grace and adoption, not by nature. Those who are converted, therefore, find that the), must answer not only to God, but also to and for the community of the faithful.

This community referent is vividly clear in the examples of Isaiah, Peter, and Paul. It is also clear that the nature and the extent of the responsibility to and for the community is a function of the unique call with the different gifts individuals have received. For many people this responsibility, will be exercised first and most immediately in the family, the ecclesiola in ecclesia.

Secondly, there is the narrative referent. I borrow the term narrative

¹⁸ Both Stendahl, pp. 23 - 40 and Gerard S. Sloyan. Is Christ the End of the Law? (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1978), pp. 74 - 104, make it a point that Paul himself was in no way obsessed with his own sins nor did he find keeping the law particularly difficult. For Paul that was not the human predicament.
¹⁹ The phrase is borrowed from Dorothy Day. See her biographN, William Robert Miller. A Harsh and Dreadful Love: Dorothy, Day and the Catholic Worker Movement (New York: Liveright. 1973).

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from Stanley Hauerwas and I used it to mean what I understand him to mean by it, that Christians have a normative story in accord with which they are called to form their character and their common life. ²⁰ A willingness to submit to the story, to allow one's purposes and intentions, one's character and relationships to be shaped by the story is a normative aspect of Christian conversion. And, of course, since the normative story is not my story and not under my control (I am called to enter into the story and make it my own), to insist that I am the sole authentic Interpreter of the story is, in effect, to refuse submission to the story. The Christian story is the story of Jesus and the story of his people. Consequently the community referent and the narrative referent go hand in hand, which is why, in more formal theological terms, one must acknowledge and wrestle with the authority of Scripture, tradition, and the church. ²¹

The rational referent to Christian conversion suggests the authority embedded in the natural, created, and developed resources of human persons. In saying this I no doubt reveal my penchant for some version of natural law morality, but I am not concerned at the moment to defend such an extensive claim. I only wish to suggest that a normative aspect of Christian conversion is the acceptance and embracing of God's creation and so of God the Creator. What that means can be made more specific by pointing to an acceptance of what one is in terms of the givens of one's life, one's race, ethnic heritage, color, sex, size, human talents, limitations, and so on. It would include an acceptance of human finitude, sociality, historicity, and physicality. It would accept and value the human capacity for intellectual, aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual growth. It would mean the acceptance of the world as world with all its diversity, challenge, and unfinished nature. I am suggesting that a conversion that is not in principle open to the future and the need for human growth in all dimensions is as little a Christian conversion as one that is in principle not open to the Cross or to membership in the community of the faithful.

Finally, a fourth referent of the call to holiness is what I would call the personal referent. By this I mean the acceptance of the responsibility for one's own judgments of conscience or, in more religious terms, for one's personal response to God. There are numerous biblical texts and examples that convey the meaning intended here, but the story of the rich young man (Mark 10: 17 - 22) will serve as well as any to illustrate the need for a personal response to the call of God, even though others may not be asked to sacrifice as much or respond in a similar way. The example of Peter in John 21, where he is told to follow Jesus and not worry about God's plan for John, also illustrates the point. The three

²⁰ Ha 20 Hauerwas, pp. 36 - 71, 89 - 152.
²¹ The relationship of the authority of the Scriptures. tradition, and the present church community is not simply a Catholic problem. See, e.g.. Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in Christian Life (Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House. 1976), pp. 125 - 159.

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examples with which I began make the same point. Isaiah, Peter, Paul were called to carry out individual tasks unique to themselves. They did not ignore the other three referents I have mentioned - that way lies madness and fanaticism - but neither did they use them to protect themselves from the radically personal call of God.

IV

We have argued that the normative meaning of Christian conversion is to be found in a basic structure of human experience, involving the initiative of God's action and provoking a two - sided, inseparable response. This response involves the acknowledgment and confession of one's lostness and sinfulness as well as the acceptance of a call to holiness. This call in turn has four clear concrete referents or ethical aspects, involving the authority of: the Christian community, the Christian story, reason, and personal conscience. These submissions are, of course, in principle only, since every individual has to work out in life the conflicts and tensions that arise in daily living among these authorities. But to refuse one or more of these authorities in principle is to refuse to respond to the central moral message of Jesus.

What this foundational conversion experience means for Christian ethics, I believe, is that the converted inevitably will understand morality differently from the non - converted. In practice, what will appear to some as only a psychological or social problem will for the Christian have a primary moral significance, and it will make sense to say about some issues that Christians don't behave that way ^.22 To that extent I am in full agreement with Stanley Hauerwas' claim for a distinctively Christian social ethic and that what can only be seen as one choice among many by the non - Christian will be perceived by Christians as a duty. ²³ Accordingly, it should be possible to show how Christian conversion casts moral problems in a different light ^.24 Let me conclude, then, by trying this on one area of social justice, the question or unequal wealth .

It has become a truism to say that the American consumer ethos conflicts with the Gospel warning that one cannot serve both God and mammon (Luke 16:13), that materialism stands in sharp contradiction to the Gospel ideals of stewardship and preferential concern for the poor and disadvantaged. At the same time, the practical implication of the Gospel ideal remains elusive for the average middle - class American Christian. Short of the total renunciation of all possessions, we seem able to recommend little more than spiritual detachment from one's material possessions and generous personal giving to worthy causes. In some

²² Ibid., P. 220. For the sense it does make. see Richard A. McCormick, "Notes on Moral Theology: 1981. Theological Studies 43,1 (March 1982), p. 90.
²³ Hauerwas, pp. 1 - 5.
²⁴ Ibid pp. 135 - 229 tries to do this in regard to having children and abortion. Andrew M. Greeley, The New Agenda (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1973). pp. 159 - 160, does something similar in regard to the issue of pre - marital sex.

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cases, tithing has again become fashionable as a useful practical guide for what is generous, or as the only biblical guideline available. The normative experience of conversion which I have tried to describe would want to say at least five things about this problem.

First, the accumulation and use of material possessions is not a matter of moral indifference in the Christian way of life. We are not the owners but the stewards of our possessions and so we need to recognize that we can, do, and have sinned in this regard. An essential correlative to this acknowledgment moreover is the demand to listen meaningfully to the cries of the poor, the hungry, the naked who are the mediators of God's presence among us (Matt. 25:31 - 46). While I think such meaningful listening is the intelligible intent of contemporary liberation theologians in demanding solidarity with the oppressed, I find this way of putting the matter both less ideological and also more realistic.

Second, the spiritual detachment from material possessions counselled in the Christian tradition must have as part of its external embodiment a responsible support of the Christian community's concrete mission in the world. What constitutes responsible support is having shared reasons for giving and using one's wealth, in company with the Christian story, so that almsgiving or charity or giving from one's surplus to the needy is not a work of supererogation but a Christian duty. ²⁵

This leads to the third thing to be said, namely, that spiritual detachment from material possessions also needs to be fostered in repeated confrontation with the Christian story and the biblical texts that challenge our greed and our supposed right to a given standard of living.

These three points largely shape an attitude toward material possessions and wealth, but they are not without practical import. At least one student of mine was profoundly shocked to discover that the Christian Gospel challenged his desire and ambition to make as much money as he could and so undermined his fundamental reason for being in school at all. Other students have been equally shocked to learn that material aid to the poor and disadvantaged is biblically not a matter of sentimental and paternalistic good will but of strict duty and justice. Doubtless many other examples will come readily to mind.

The last two things to be said about the issue of wealth also ask for recognition rather than providing answers. In submitting to the authority of personal conscience, we open ourselves to the real possibility that God may well be calling us- or even our families - to live and work in ways that will demand sacrifices and afford a standard of living considerably different and lower than what is considered to be average or normal. This is a situation man), of us who teach or work in church - related institutions already experience, though not always with

²⁵ Jacob Viner, Religious Thought and Economic Society (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1978).

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the sense of mission and the absence of resentment and complaint faith would seem to call for. Before the call of God, there is no such thing as a right to a certain standard of living. ²⁶

Submission to the authority of reason, which conversion entails, warns us against either sentimental or ideological responses to the problem of material inequality. It is the tradition of reason in Christian faith which argues for the relative importance of human activity in the world and which makes it clear that people are not fed, homes are not built, clothes are not produced and distributed by sentimental good will and pure hearts, but by intelligence and hard work. It is also the tradition of reason which argues that while Christians may find capitalism or socialism or some other economic system here and now a more just and equitable system, they may not embrace such a system on the grounds of faith and give it the absolute loyalty which only the Kingdom of God may claim.

It is the tradition of reason that refuses to identify the Christian way of life with the American way of life, or the socialist way, or any other political option. ²⁷ It is, to conclude, the tradition of reason that insists human beings take responsibility for their political and economic choices and not see in their affluence or poverty either the cruel hand of fate or the benign finger of God. The normative conception of conversion which we have proposed cannot tell an), of us what use to make of our material goods, but it does provide the foundation on which such decisions can be made in a way that has some claim to be called the Christian way.

²⁶ There is. of course. such a right before our fellow human beings.
²⁷ This is the important point made repeatedly in an otherwise disappointing book, James V. Schall, S.J., Christian and Politics (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1981).