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Benne and Novak on Capitalism
By Daniel A. Dombrowski

MR. SMITH, the Adam of capitalism, once said that: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Paul Samuelson, the dean of liberal economists in America, says that to understand the point that Adam Smith is making here is the zenith of capitalist wisdom. It is not too surprising to note that conservative economists, like Milton Friedman, agree. Therefore, both liberal and conservative economists still see Smith's insight as the cornerstone of capitalist theory, however much they may disagree on other matters.

Two recent books try to defend capitalism from a Christian perspective: Robert Benne's The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981) and Michael Novak's The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (N.Y.: American Enterprise Institute and Simon and Schuster, 1982). Benne is aware of the difficulty of such a project, since agape is disinterested love (39). The problem is: how can such a love be compatible with the self-interested core of capitalist theory and practice? Since Benne often uses the term "self-interest" as one of denigration, especially in reference to those whose myopia he opposes (18, 46, 147), the difficulty becomes even more acute.

I

Benne's solution to the problem, if I understand him, seems to be that capitalism has the virtue of reducing the need for agape since market systems, relying on voluntary exchange relationships based on self-interest, decrease the need for consensus on the moral, ideological, and social levels (143). Although he does not explicitly use Smith's image, the virtues that capitalism possesses seem to be due to the "invisible hand" that the market exhibits, which transforms self-interest into something beneficial for all. That is, the free market system provides a rough substratum of "natural justice" which, in a way, replaces the need for agape (144). It is curious that Benne does not state why this market "justice" is natural as opposed to conventional; are we to suppose that capitalism is something like gravity? Benne does not defend laissez-faire capitalism, however. It is democratic capitalism that he likes, otherwise called reform, liberal, or redistributive capitalism. This variety of

Daniel A. Dombrowski is Professor of Philosophy at Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska. He is the author of Plato's Philosophy of History and numerous articles, mostly in philosophy journals.

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capitalism prevents degeneration into Social Darwinism or Reaganomics, which Benne would criticize (x, 156). His thesis is that:

Democratic capitalism can be legitimated as a relatively just form of society now, with the prospect of significant improvement in the future ( 18).

Two sources inform Benne's position. From Reinhold Niebuhr he learns that the fundamental cause of human egoism (and presumably, self-interest) is not in the external conditions of society (e.g., private property) but in human nature itself (33). Hence, Christian anthropology is built not only on agape, but also on the self-centeredness of sin (43), which conveniently allows Benne to make rapprochement with the self-interested anthropology that capitalism encourages. Because of the presence of sin, Benne must, he thinks, defend the "Protestant principle," which suggests that power should never be concentrated too much in any one source. This distinguishes him' on his view, from socialists, Marxists, and other adherents of "Perfectionism."

The other great influence is John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971), which Benne attempts to Christianize, so as to provide a theoretical basis to distinguish him from Milton Friedman and the like. According to Benne, Rawls sets up a hypothetical contract situation in which rational persons would arrive at agreement on principles that would reflect the dictum: Love your neighbor as yourself (52). Rawls' justice as fairness is indeed, Benne thinks, a reflection of "the law written in the heart" (54, 56). In particular, Rawls' difference principle (which suggests that the distribution of wealth need not be equal if unequal distribution is to the advantage of the least favored persons) is claimed to have unmistakable connections with Christian agape (62, 79, 203). Benne unfortunately does not notice that Rawls: (1) insists that parties in the original hypothetical position be self-interested, or at least mutually disinterested, rather than loving, (see A Theory of Justice, p. 13); and (2) claims that his theory of justice is compatible with both economics based on private property and socialism (ibid., 266-274), the latter of which Benne tries to argue against. To miss the former point allows Benne to beg the question as to how Rawls' difference principle bridges the gap between capitalist self-interest and agape; to miss the latter begs the question as to how Rawls' theory can be used to exclusively defend capitalism, as opposed to socialism. Further, the system of taxation necessary for Rawls' difference principle to work seems to be at odds with Benne's affection for the Protestant principle, whose limited government seems to entail relatively low taxes (160). It is bard to see how Benne can have his cake and eat it too.

In the end Benne seems to be claiming that Christianity lifts agape up as the "ultimate religious and ethical norm" despite the fact that it "cannot triumph over the stubborn self-interest of group life" (80); this places quite an emphasis on Benne's Niebuhrian theory of sin. Agape can only make a difference in the economic arena as a distant ideal (81 ).

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When Benne finally takes up the challenges to democratic capitalism, he needs the "muscle" of self-interest to bolster what is by now anemic agape (249-254). "Marketing hedonism" and "adversary culture" (A la Daniel Bell) are the major challenges he has in mind. Apparently, it never occurs to Benne that what he sees as the disease of hedonism marketed by American capitalism is caused by the very self-interest that is supposed to be the major part of the cure. Although this book is ingenuous in its attempt to bring Rawls within the Christian fold, it still leaves many questions unanswered.

II

Novak's apologia for democratic capitalism is, in many ways, similar to Benne's. Novak also relies on Niebuhr, but he makes use of Catholic writers like Aquinas and Lonergan. The hero of the book, however, seems to be Adam Smith, who is the "genius chiefly responsible" for the insight that human beings can gain control over the economic system on which they depend (77). What Novak likes in Smith is the lack of attention paid to moral motives; instead, Smith pays attention to the beneficial outcomes of our actions, even if they are generated through self-interest (79).

Unfortunately, Novak is not as careful as he should be in his panegyric to Smith. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith makes it clear that proper motivation is needed for an act to be moral (II.i. intro.2; II. i. 4. 1). In this regard, Smith makes distinctions among the types of passions, of which there are three (I. ii. 5. 1; III. 6. 6; VII. iii. 1. 4). The first sort of passion is social (e.g., sympathy), the sort that all would agree is compatible with, and perhaps approximates, Christian love. The second type of passion is unsocial (e.g., selfishness or greed), which is antithetical to the spirit of Christianity. The third sort is of most interest; this is not as disagreeable as greed, nor as agreeable as love (e.g., self-interest). Only the first sort is clearly moral, and although the third sort is morally neutral, through the invisible hand of capitalism it can materially benefit others. Smith cannot resist the temptation, however, to excuse and even commend the actions of a selfish man if he materially benefits others (IV. 1. 10), thus contradicting many of his favorite positions regarding man's natural sympathy and proper motivation.

Novak expands on Smith's alchemy; somehow Novak thinks not only that self-interest may materially benefit others, but may in addition lead to "a highly moral outcome" (79). Novak can be granted, at least for the sake of argument, that (Emersonian) self-reliance is commendable in that one should not place unnecessary burdens on others (85, 129, 130, 135, 155, 346, 357), and that self-interest may benefit others materially. What Novak does not prove is one of his most important theses, that the unintended consequences of self-interest make self-interest a virtue (82).Until he can argue sufficiently for this thesis, democratic capital-

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ism can at best be a morally neutral system based on self-interest, perhaps compatible with Christianity, but certainly not supported by it or doing its work.

Novak usually makes it clear that he opposes selfishness (92-93). But like Smith he is sometimes forced to confuse the distinction between self-interest and selfishness (62, 146). Perhaps this is an indication that there is not as rigid a distinction between the two, especially in a world of scarcity, as the defender of democratic capitalism would like. Giving Novak the benefit of the doubt, he seems to be only defending the creative use of self-interest (92). But stating that self-interest is a virtue is different from stating how or why it is a virtue; the latter task Novak does not even attempt (92-95); in fact, he does not even tell us what he means by the term "virtue." Even if we construe self-interest widely to include acting in the interest of one's family (163, 165), it is still not clear how seeking one's own (or one's family's) interests yields "in return loyalty and love" for the community at large (my emphasis-226). Does not love (caritas) have to be intended in order to be love? Apparently not, for Novak; hence, he can make the extraordinary claims he does for democratic capitalism.

He is not unaware of the problems that face him in his attempt to not only make democratic capitalism compatible with Christianity, but also to have their respective "virtues" interpenetrate (357). Two maneuvers are used by him. First, every once in a while he contradicts his lack of concern for motive by saying that self-interested democratic capitalism intends to help every portion of mankind (83); or that chief executive officers of large corporations are "inspired" by moral virtues like Christian caritas (131); or that the ideals of democratic capitalism command that destitution in Latin America be eliminated (312). But these are such extravagant claims that not even Novak tries to make them too often. What is more typical of Novak (and Benne) is to claim that:

Human beings, even the most devout and serious Christians, cannot be expected to act always and in all ways as Christians ought to act (68).... The single greatest temptation for Christians is to imagine that the salvation won by Jesus has altered the human condition. Many attempt to judge the present world by the standards of the Gospels, as though the world were ready to live according to them.... A political economy based on love and justice is to be found beyond, never to be wholly incarnated within, human history (343-344)... . No intelligent human order ... can be run according to the counsels of Christianity.... A free economy cannot ... be a Christian economy (352).

That is, Novak either claims too much for capitalist self-interest or too little for Christian love.

Even if Novak's criticisms of Marxism and liberation theology are well-founded, as I think they are, it does not necessarily follow that he has made his case regarding democratic capitalism. What he needs to do more than anything else is to examine more closely the problems he

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inherits from Adam Smith: Why is capitalism associated with selfishness "throughout the world"? (1); how do the unintended consequences of capitalism "take on Satan"? (82); how do "less than moral sentiments result in superior moral outcomes" if morality, as Christian theorists and Smith admit, depends on proper intention? (my emphasis-147); why will love necessarily evolve out of self-love in democratic capitalism? (149); and finally, what does it mean to say that the self-interest of the aforementioned butcher, brewer, or baker includes "natural (?) benevolence"? (160).

III

Like the men who gain the whole world but lose their very souls, Benne and Novak seem to have answered every question about the defense of a friendly relationship between democratic capitalism-and Christianity except the essential ones.