| 129 - Love and Conflict: A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics |
Love and Conflict:
A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics
By Joseph L. Allen
Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1984. 336 pp. $12.95.
Some problems are both central and perennial in the formulation of a basic Christian ethical viewpoint. The shape of any such viewpoint will be defined by the answers it gives to those problems, and its weight will depend on the cohesiveness and balance of its answers. The problems in question include the authority of Scripture in ethics; the relation between individual and social ethics; the relations between love and justice, and between justice and coercion; the connection between moral acts and moral relationships; the difference between and interdependence of individual and social morality, especially when social institutions perpetuate injustice; and the nature and depth of sin.
In Love and Conflict, Joseph L. Allen, professor of Christian ethics at the Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, integrates his analysis of these problems by taking as his point of departure the biblical theme of covenant. In so doing, he commits himself to take the Bible seriously as the indispensable and distinctive foundation of Christian ethics, and to understand the Bible primarily as the source of a comprehensive understanding of humanity in relation to God, rather than as the source of moral rules. Allen defines a covenant as an enduring interpersonal relationship or "moral community" which is established through "interactions of entrusting and accepting entrustment" (32). Many moral relations arise out of particular historical covenantal transactions, or "special covenants." Allen devotes the final chapters of the book to three types of special covenant: marriage, political community, and the church. The most fundamental human relation, however, is the "inclusive covenant": "God has created all people to live in covenant with God and with one another" (39-40). This fundamental covenant awaits humanity's trusting acceptance for its completion, even though it is originally brought about by God's will.
The notion of covenant establishes the sociality of persons. The standard of covenantal relation is covenant love, imitative of the love of God. Allen explicates its meaning by drawing on the dictum of the philosopher Immanuel Kant that persons should always be treated as "ends in themselves," never as mere means to the ends of others. Allen sees God's love as an affirmation of the worth of each person as an equal and irreplaceable individual (66).
A major dilemma for covenant love arises in cases of conflict. Conflicts occur because we experience competing claims on our love and loyalty, including the claim of self-interest; because not all legitimate claims can be met successfully, as in the distribution of society's benefits and burdens; and because wrongdoers deliberately violate legitimate claims and covenants. Interpreting New Testament models of sacrifice,
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130 - Love and Conflict: A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics |
Allen asserts "a strong but not an absolute duty to give priority to the interests of others" (116), but, with Augustine, does not exclude violent coercion as a way of expressing covenant love toward both wrongdoers and their victims (198-217). When obligations deriving from different simultaneous covenants conflict, Allen suggests several factors to be considered, including the seriousness of harm if a covenant is violated, the relation of harm to the special purpose of a particular covenant, and the chronological priority of covenants ( 141-48).
Several questions remain for further conversation. Is the theme of covenant a truly comprehensive one, or would it be more effective and more biblical to supplement it, in particular with the theme of creation? Although Allen's idea of "inclusive covenant" is closely related to that of creation, the latter notion may be able more directly to account for the fact that not all moral obligations are chosen. Finally, does Kant's imperative to treat others as ends because of their own intrinsic worth capture the Judeo-Christian understanding of God's covenantal love as merciful and gratuitous? Again, the notion of intrinsic human dignity seems to derive more directly from the biblical theme of creation in God's "image."
It must be said, however, that Allen has accomplished an original, accessible, and persuasive analysis of Christian ethics. Particularly to be appreciated is his attempt to appropriate the biblical witness thoroughly, yet without burning its bridges to philosophical or non-Christian religious analyses of right and wrong.
Lisa Sowle Cahill
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts