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The Foundations of Justice: Why the Retarded and the Rest of Us Have Claims to Equality

By Robert W. Veatch

New York, Oxford, 1986. 210 Pp. $24.95.

Six Theories of Justice: Perspectives from Philosophical and Theological Ethics

By Karen Lebacqz

Minneapolis, Augsburg, 1986. 159 Pp. $9.95.

Perhaps the most difficult issue facing religious ethics today is pluralism, the presence of competing theories of the good or the right, theories with heterogeneous cultural and religious roots. Two general responses to pluralism are developed by the books reviewed here: one seeks to overcome pluralism by arguing for a common core of thought within religious and secular sources (Veatch); the other eschews synthesis, allowing differences to stand on their own (Lebacqz). Veatch's work is both theoretical and practical, applying a theory of justice to the claims of the retarded, while Lebacqz's work is more pedagogical, less notable for its constructive ambition than for its concise overview of modern theories of justice.

Veatch argues for a notion of justice as equality of outcomes, by which he means the "opportunity for an equal level of well-being over a lifetime." To develop his case, Veatch overcomes pluralism in two general steps. First, drawing from Judaeo-Christian sources, Veatch distills a moral core of ideas: all persons are finite before an infinite source of value; creation is a gift, given in common to humanity; and human beings are to distribute resources especially to the poor and needy. From this synthesis, he derives a theological foundation for the claim that all persons, regardless of talent, have an equal claim to have their basic needs met.

Second, Veatch identifies surrogates for an egalitarian religious ethic,

 

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secular theories whose "key working assumptions are based upon or compatible with the theological assumptions of those in religious ethics." Despite their apparent rational foundations, secular theories require "faith moves," a set of prelogical assumptions not accessible to further justification. Given the necessity of faith as the starting point of reason, it is finally impossible to adjudicate the differences between egalitarians and nonegalitarians, although Veatch finally contends that, given the weight of tradition and an intuitive appeal, egalitarian premises are "more plausible."

Veatch then applies this notion of justice to the case of Eddie Conrad, a mentally retarded ten year old, whose speech, hearing, and eyesight are impaired, and who is to be transferred from a private to a public school. Veatch argues that justice requires compensating Eddie for his impairments and that it is fair to allocate public resources to this effect, even if such allocations entail cuts from funds that might benefit more gifted children. The goal of justice is to get individuals back to a starting point where they have an opportunity for equality of outcomes. Redistributing public funds to this end would not violate the objective basic needs of others, for their well-being would not be reduced to a level lower than the starting point sought for Eddie. Veatch concludes his work by excoriating an "ethic of competition," whose "very essence is squeezing satisfaction out of a proof of inequality." He also makes some sagacious comments about how not to stigmatize those who are beneficiaries of public assistance, drawing out the communitarian implications of his egalitarian ethic.

Veatch's theory, where autonomy is seen as rival to rather than constitutive of justice, departs sharply from many philosophical theories on the landscape of ethics today. His work is a vital and bold contribution to debates about the meaning of justice, the disparities of the natural lottery, and priorities in the allocation of public resources. Veatch also raises questions about cultural attitudes toward merit as a basis for justice, as well as the relation between religion and philosophy. About these more general issues, somewhat at the periphery of Veatch's main argument, two questions remain.

First, Veatch's claim that secular philosophy requires prelogical "faith moves" may not prove enough to sustain his attempt to find common ground between theologians and philosophers about the meaning of justice. That some assumptions are made, beyond full rational justification, only proves that foundations are elusive, not that theological ideas are "bootlegged" into philosophical claims. Veatch's wording-that secular philosophers hold ideas "based upon or compatible with" religious ethics-may be deliberately vague, but compatibility with religious ideas is a far cry from common foundation or conviction. Compatibility between secular and religious ethics at the normative level still allows secularists to remain agnostic about the kinds of theological claims that Veatch wishes to defend. The presence of

 

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prelogical assumptions only uncovers the absence of rational foundations. But such faith moves, even combined with the insight that religionists and secularists often defend notably similar ideas, are not sufficient to defend the idea that secular notions are "based upon" a core of theological ideas about justice.

Second, Veatch's censure of an "ethic of competition" may prove too much for his argument on behalf of equality. If the goal of justice is to provide the opportunity for equal outcomes, then it is necessary to handicap some to equalize the starting point of all. But once differences have been equalized, it would seem fair to distribute benefits according to the vagaries of competition. But Veatch's disaffection with competition is so far-reaching--both athletic and academic competition comprise an "anti-egalitarian quest for testimony of superiority in our society" that it seems virtually impossible to make competition compatible with the goal of equality. At least minimally, Veatch's critique of competition raises a general puzzlement about the extent to which justice as equality is to serve as a duty in social ethics: Is it a floor or a ceiling?

In contrast to Veatch's work, Lebacqz chooses to isolate six quite different theological and philosophical theories of justice and examines their distinctive assumptions and problems: Mill, Rawls, Nozick, the U.S. Catholic bishops, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Jose Miranda. These comprise "fragments" of justice, and an argument for a more integrated theory must await another volume. Although this appears to be a general primer in social ethics, Lebacqz carefully uncovers some of the important nuances within the philosophical figures under examination. Each chapter begins with an exposition, reviews the main points, lists a series of critiques that have emerged in the commentary, and concludes with an independent assessment. She also places these figures in dialogue with each other, observing that the philosophers are more inclined to endorse contemporary capitalism, while the theological figures express more caution.

Lebacqz has provided an extremely useful volume for undergraduates and beginning graduate students. Her work might have been aided by a brief discussion, perhaps at the outset of each chapter, of the distinctive problem to which each of her authors addressed themselves, and how this problem shaped the theory of justice under consideration. Moreover, it is unclear what principle of selection led to these six figures and not, for example, Michael Walzer (whose work is footnoted). Her observation about secular and religious attitudes toward capitalism is more a function of the figures she selects than the nature of philosophy and theology. If such attitudes are a function of the distinctiveness of theology, a supporting argument should have been developed.

Much is to be gained from reading and wrestling with these two works. In their approach to pluralism, their attitudes to theology and philosophy, and in their constructive aims, they complement each other

 

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well. They are designed to instruct a wide audience, reaching far beyond more specialized concerns of philosophy and religious studies.

RICHARD B. MILLER

Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana