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Race, Equality and Religion
By Edward A. Tiryakian

Ever since the much publicized and influential 1954 Supreme Court decision concerning integration in public education, the question of racial segregation (or its obverse, racial integration) has attained national prominence in a variety of contexts. Even without the Supreme Court decision, post-World War II socioeconomic-political conditions in the United States and abroad have accentuated the importance of race relations as a topic of primary importance. The former status quo wherein the White race had established socio economic political superiority over non-Whites is rapidly crumbling, and the legitimacy of the former status quo has today hardly any public defenders, either in the United States or in the rest of the world. Even in the American South the conservative Whites advocate a gradual integration policy and seem to resent more that integration appears to be forced upon them by Northern liberals than that there should be any integration at all. In the Union of South Africa, often cited as the last bastion of White racial supremacy, one must note that the doctrine of apartheid stresses in theory the separation of races for the mutual benefit of both, not the perpetual bondage of non Whites. All in all, then, with a few exceptions, most public statements on racial integration assume or take for granted that racial integration is a necessary and desirable state of affairs, and conversely that racial segregation or racial inequality should be condemned.

Even among social scientists whose code of ethics qua scientists professes objectivity, organized skepticism, and personal detachment concerning whatever social phenomena be under investigation, the subject of race relations seems to be a singularly different species:

The major studies of the race problems have quite boldly affirmed their moral bias and defended a departure from strict scientific neutrality as necessary and good.¹

¹ Waldo Beach, "A Theological Analysis of Race Relations," in Paul Ramsey, ed., Faith and Ethics, The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 207.

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Amidst the tremendous diversity of attention paid to race relations as manifested in myriads of studies dealing with economic political, legal, communal, and other aspects, there is one field of investigation which, surprisingly enough, has been rather neglected relative to its fundamental significance. Just what are the moral sources which provide the ethical justification for abolishing race segregation and for advocating racial equality? What constitutes the normative basis for doing away with the old social status quo? This will constitute the task of this paper, in which the writer will try to advance the thesis that if any universal and ethically binding grounds can be advanced for racial integration, they can be located only within Christian theology.

We shall approach our thesis by employing the method of reduction: that is, we shall examine other than theological grounds which are commonly advanced as providing justification for racial integration, and we shall see whether in fact they are capable of providing the moral basis necessary. If they can be shown to be unable to provide the normative justification, we shall then be left with the theological argument, which will be examined in turn.

I

To begin, we first cite a commonly used argument against racial segregation, the economic one: separate and even theoretically equal) facilities for Whites and Negroes is economically a costly proposition. It involves waste of economic resources which might be used more efficiently.

This economic argument may have various ramifications, but, without denying its economic soundness, what normative or ethical justification does it advance? In all honesty, the answer must be none. if Whites in the South (and in the North) are willing to pay the costs of racial segregation (and certainly economists will not contest that Whites pay a greater share of the tax burden than non Whites) regardless of what the financial burden may be, then certainly this economic inefficiency provides no good moral reason for altering the status quo. If Whites are willing to pay the financial price of racial segregation, how can the economic argument be used as a normative justification for racial integration?

A second argument frequently advanced against racial segregation involves reference to political factors. One current version of this

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runs as follows: in our present titanic battle against international Communism we can ill afford to have Communist propaganda in Asia and Africa make capital of the racial situation in the South or, for that matter, any form of racial segregation in the rest of the United States. Little Rock and other more recent incidents give Moscow potent weapons in its attempt to alienate emergent Black Africa from the United States, and at the same time limit the effectiveness of our barbs at Soviet imperialism in the satellite countries.

Now, this argument is also a very practical one, and undoubtedly contains much political acumen. But a second's reflection will make us aware that to argue from political expediency is far from advancing any ethical or moral justification for racial integration; in reality, this argument is as barren of a normative basis for abolishing racial inequalities as was the economic argument.

However, another form of political contention demands our attention. America is a democracy, and although the majority has the right to decide, the minority's rights in a democracy must be safeguarded. The Negroes constitute a minority, therefore their rights ought to be protected and secured.

Does this not provide the moral basis for racial integration so that we need search no further? Actually, this argument opens up a Pandora's box and by no means provides the necessary and sufficient moral basis which we are seeking. First of all, consider just the South alone. Undoubtedly, the great majority of Whites there favor some form of segregation, some sort of White supremacy in economic, political, and social affairs. Since they constitute a political majority, then their wishes ought to be allowed, although the rights of non-Whites equally ought to be safeguarded-but how can one decide on ethical grounds whether to give primacy to the rights of the majority or to those of the minority? To a large extent, does this not depend upon our personal feelings vis-à-vis the particular majority or the particular minority? If we make a sort of categorical imperative that the rights of the minority ought to be safeguarded, then in terms of the United States as a whole, Southern Whites in Congress form a definite minority, and consequently their rights ought to be given priority over those from the liberal North and West. Somehow, civil rights advocates take a dim view of filibusters and other political safeguards of Southern Whites as thwarting the majority in Congress, but is this not inconsistent with their

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supporting the rights of Negroes in the South who form a political minority there? So this boils down to which minority one feels sympathetic towards, rather than any consistent ethical stand. Therefore, we must conclude that political arguments concerning the desirability of ending racial segregation may have political merit but in themselves can provide no binding ethical or moral basis.

II

If economic and political arguments in favor of racial integration fail to provide us with a moral justification-although they may provide it on other grounds-for abolishing racial segregation, then perhaps we can turn to social scientists such as social psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists. As part of their professional duties they conduct empirical investigations on social phenomena, including race relations. What are the findings of those pursuing "the science of society," and what data have they obtained through scientific procedures that can provide us with the ethical justification for racial integration? What is the position of scientific experts in social relations concerning this crucial problem?

First of all, it may be pointed out that the position of social scientists vis-à-vis ethics and normative pronouncements concerning social phenomena is very problematical and complex, to say the least. On the one hand, there are those who uphold the positivistic tradition of objectivity, detachment, and the separation of science from social ethics and normative judgments. Perhaps the leading spokesman of this camp is the well-known sociologist George Lundberg whose position is summarized in the following statements:

When a question involves a value judgment as to what people should want, scientists cannot give an unconditional answer. . . . There are no research procedures thus far developed that can verify the claim that men should desire one thing rather than something else.²

While this view is probably voiced at the ideological level by the majority of academic social scientists, a contrasting position also has been ably represented by such figures as Robert Lynd³ and George Simpson,⁴ who have held that, by the nature of their work, social

² George A. Lundberg, Clarence C. Schrag, Otto N. Larsen, Sociology, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), pp. 16 f.
³ Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939).
⁴ Science as Morality (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Humanist Press, 1953).

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scientists should take an active part in applying their findings to improving social life and in general should realize that there is a close interrelation between science and morality-in other words, that there can be no separation between science and ethics.

So the question as to whether it is in the nature of the social sciences to tell us what is or is not a desirable state of social affairs is very difficult to answer. Moreover, one standpoint which directly or indirectly claims many adherents in the social sciences increases the confusion and complexity of the issue: the standpoint of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism (directly related to ethical relativity in philosophy) in essence states that each socio-cultural system has evolved its own patterns of life, including moral behavior, that these patterns cannot be evaluated against an objective yardstick, and that therefore one cannot make invidious comparisons of one culture's patterns in terms of the observers' own culture. Such an invidious comparison is termed "ethnocentrism," and in the majority of textbooks written by anthropologists or sociologists, ethnocentrism is implicitly or explicitly treated as a practice which not only curtails scientific objectivity, but which ". . . results in prejudicial language and overt behaviors taking such organizational forms as the missionary movement, wars, and educational and religious indoctrination."⁵

Needless to say, agreement with strict cultural relativism is incompatible with espousing racial integration on universal ethical grounds. If one accepts the principle that each socio-cultural system's solution of moral problems involving interpersonal relations is as good or as valid as any other, then one must accept the existent pattern of racial segregation and inequality in the American South or in the Union of South Africa.⁶

Of course, one must point out that in the face of Nazism and Communism, acceptance of cultural relativism today is more limited than a generation ago: "Emotionally and practically, this extreme position is hardly tolerable-even for scholars-in the contemporary world."⁷ Summarizing recent trends, the distinguished anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn has stated, "The human parade has many

⁵ John F. Cuber, Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles, 4th ed. (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, Inc., 1959), pp. 118 f.
⁶ Moreover, the acceptance of cultural relativism coupled with ethnocentrism is logically and emotionally incongruent with the attempt to bring the Gospel to non-Christians, for would not this be violating the moral sanctity of non-Christian socio-cultural systems?
⁷ Clyde Kluckhohn, "Ethical Relativity- Sic Et Non" The Journal of Philosophy, LII (November 10, 1955), p. 663.

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floats, but, when one strips off the cultural symbolism, the ethical standards represented are akin."⁸ Although unwilling to accept metaphysical absolutes, he is willing to go so far as to say that there are, or that there may be, " conditional" or "moving" absolutes in the empirical sense. But although one finds universal moral concepts (such as the concept of murder, the notion of incest, mutual obligations between parents and children), Kluckhohn goes on to state that "universality as such is not transmutable into a categorical imperative."⁹

In brief, then, at the general level, the relation between the social sciences and ethics or morality is not clear-cut, and a consensus seems lacking. Although one might wish for something more hopeful and positive, one has to agree with the observation that "by proclaiming moral relativity and hence the relativity of contemporary morality, science presumably undermines absolute morality but has difficulty in establishing a morality relative to the present."¹⁰

Even granting that social scientists cannot give us categorical imperatives, perhaps a hopeful beginning may be made if we look at what their scientific research has unearthed concerning race segregation or racial equality, or placed in a broader perspective, social stratification and social equality. What have they found out?

Certainly, the empirical findings are very extensive and complex, but if we get to the core of the matter, we find that either there is a lack of valid general propositions or else what has been found is not very encouraging from the point of view of racial integration. Thus,

Desegregation does not automatically entail mutual acceptance. Desegregation at first will be overwhelmingly opposed by the general public. It therefore will have to be accomplished without the support of public opinion.¹¹

More generally, empirical findings all attest to social inequalities of diverse sorts and degrees among ethnic and racial groups, and a universal finding is that social stratification exists in all complex societies. In no presently known society does social equality exist or persist on a large scale-not even societies which profess it ideo-

⁸ Ibid, p. 673.
⁹ Ibid., P. 672.
¹⁰ George Simpson, op. cit., p. 12.
¹¹ Edward A. Suchman, John P. Dean, and Robin M. Williams, Jr., Desegregation: SomePropositions and Research Suggestions (New York, 1958).

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logically, such as the Communist countries, for even there patterns of social stratification slowly but inexorably develop. In the face of these cold facts, it is remarkable that social scientists have refused to accept this as being the "natural" order of social life, and that many sociologists for a variety of reasons have attacked the existence of social stratification and racial differences and inequalities:

The patent differentials . . . are generally regarded by social scientists as cultural traits, "acquired" characteristics, which can in no fair sense be regarded as biologically inherent. . . . The actual empirical levels of superiority and inferiority which we meet in daily racial contacts are treated as deviation from a norm which is "given."¹²

Waldo Beach has, I think, neatly pinpointed the situation in remarking that social scientists today implicitly or unconsciously are a priori committed to an ontological preference for equality over inequality, and that this doctrine guides empirical investigations to their a posteriori conclusions.¹³ He himself does not decry this preference, but wishes to make clear just what are the grounds for this moral preference, this commitment which goes counter to the empirical evidence. If, as we have attempted to demonstrate, economic, political, and sociological arguments provide absolutely no consistent or demonstrable support upon which to construct the moral basis of racial integration, what grounds remain, if any? And the answer to this brings us back to the original thesis of this paper, which coincides with the conclusion of Beach:

To account adequately, in short, for the presence and power of the norm of human brotherhood in history, one must go beyond humanity and history and say that the norm is grounded in the revelation of God's grace.¹⁴

Certainly, the relationship between religious belief systems-and in particular Christian ethics-and patterns of race relations has been pointed out previously by various theologians and religious figures;¹⁵ just during 1958, for example, both the Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church and the Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States took a public stand supporting the Supreme Court decision and calling for the eradication of racial segregation.

¹² Beach, op. cit., p. 210.
¹³ Ibid.
¹⁴ Ibid., P. 222.
¹⁵ See, for example, George Kelsey, "Racial Patterns and the Churches," THEOLOGY TODAY, IX (April, 1952), pp. 67-77; Rachel Henderlite, "The Christian Way in Race Relations," THEOLOGY TODAY, XIV (July, 1957), pp. 195-211.

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III

Just what is the theological argument advanced in favor of racial equality and desegregation? Essentially, it might be formulated as embodying the following points: God has created all men with equal rights and equal dignity, hence we should see to it that non-Whites obtain their full rights as given to them by our common Creator and as guaranteed by the Constitution. Second, as Christ has taught us to love our fellow man, and as we are all united in the Christian brotherhood, we should seek to end all feelings of prejudice and friction between any and all racial groups, and to abolish any social system which perpetuates the inferiority of one part of this brotherhood.¹⁶

In brief, then, Christianity with its fundamental belief in the unity and brotherhood of mankind in Christ, and with its doctrine of universal love, is the only possible moral source which can offer an ethically binding support for racial integration. It is only Christianity which can assert that all men are equal in the sight of God. The social scientists may secretly wish for the equality of men, but up to now all their research-no matter how carefully the interpretations have glossed over this point-have only pointed out that inequality prevails in the social order.

It would be quite easy to stop our analysis at this point, perhaps having secured the approval of theologians (and perhaps having vexed some social scientists). But the writer would like to advance one disturbing thought which must be explicated in fuller detail, namely: have not religious leaders gone beyond Christianity in lending Christian arguments to support racial integration, and have they become fully aware of the full implication of their pronouncements? Or at least, what we would like to point out is that the present interpretation of Christianity in regards to race relations and social stratification is by no means the traditional interpretation, especially in the light of either the teachings of the Gospels or of the Early Church.

If we consider the teachings of Christ as contained in the Gospels, we find no concern with improving social conditions, but solely with improving moral conditions, with preparing man for the Kingdom of God. As Ernest Troeltsch remarked in his monumental study,

¹⁶ I have distilled these statements from the recent (November 1958) pronouncements of the Methodist Bishops and the Catholic Bishops, as reported in the New York Times, November 14, 1958. Regardless of other theological controversies, it seems to me that all the Christian Churches in America would agree with these propositions.

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"It is a great mistake to treat all the ideas which underlie the preaching of Jesus as though they were primarily connected with the "Social" problem. The message of Jesus is obviously purely religious."¹⁷ That message was essentially the salvation of souls, and this was the message understood by the early followers of Christ.

"It is worthy of special note that Early Christian apologetic contains no arguments dealing either with hopes of improving the existing social situation, or with any attempt to heal social ills."¹⁸

Is not the other-worldly orientation of Christ the basis of his explicit disjunction of the Kingdom of God from the Kingdom of Caesar? And is not the present attempt of the Church to ameliorate social conditions, to do away with social inequities, the cementing together of the two? In the liberal humanitarian social climate of the modern period, such an attempt on the part of the Church in the United States to justify racial integration in terms of religious beliefs seems not only just and desirable, but it also appears to be the "natural" path for the Church to follow. But what the Church seems to overlook is that the inspiration to attack the present pattern of social stratification and race relations stems more from the general humanitarian social climate than it does from the original teachings and practices of the Christian Church. And in attacking only racial segregation as a nefarious feature of social stratification, religious figures have not been as consistent or comprehensive as Communists, who attack all of social stratification for perpetrating inequalities on the human race. Yet, racial segregation is just one feature of the system of social stratification, so why draw the line at this point?

What is the message of the New Testament and of the Christian Church concerning equality (or its obverse, stratification)? Certainly, this is one of the most important tenets of the Christian faith, and we should have its meaning clearly in mind: "We are all equal in these fundamental aspects: we have all sinned, we all fall short of the glory of God and can only be saved by the grace of God."¹⁹ This equality of men has meaning only in terms of their relation to God, and as Troeltsch remarked about the early Church,

¹⁷ The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches, trans. by Olive Wyon (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1931), vol. 1, p. 56.
¹⁸ Ibid., p. 40.
¹⁹ Ben J. Marais, Human Diversity and Christian Unity, Peter Ainslie Memorial Lecture (Grahamstown, S. A.- Rhodes University, 1957), p. 18.

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It is, however, also not difficult to understand that Christianity, along with all the radical equalizing of men in the sight of God and with all the penetration of this idea in the whole life of the soul, and in all personal relations of men to one another, is yet at the same time very cautious towards any attempt to carry over this equality into the sphere of secular relationships and institutions, which have nothing to do with the real religious basis of this equality.²⁰

It seems to the writer that equating or extending the notion of religious or spiritual equality to that of social equality is an unwarranted extension of Christian theology. Moreover, when one begins an attempt to support or attack social institutions and practices on theological grounds-even those of Christianity-the results can only be inconclusive and harmful to the unity of the Church. For example, although in the United States today most religious leaders stress opposition to racial segregation on religious grounds, one hundred years ago in the South religious grounds were equally used to support the institution of slavery. Similarly, the writer has elsewhere indicated how Calvinistic religious belief systems have functioned in the Union of South Africa to provide the major moral justification of the policy of apartheid and to support in the frontier setting of that country the harsh pattern of native servitude by the Boers.²¹

Before closing, it might be well for the writer to avoid the impression that he is in favor of a pattern of racial inequality characterized by the old status quo, and that he is seeking to advance theological grounds in support of this. This is not the case; the writer is as equally opposed to using theological principles to justify racial segregation as he is opposed to using them to justify racial integration. And there is nothing more deplorable in the writer's mind than the stand which the Transvaal Dutch Reformed Church in 1951 took in stating that apartheid within the Church was not only permissible but obligatory, and did this on Scriptural ground. This, also, seems to be an instance of erroneously seeking to integrate the Kingdom of Caesar with the Kingdom of God.

What, then, should be the position of the Church on the matter of equality, and what should be the Christian perspective on race relations? It should be to assert that in the realm of spirit all men are equal, bound together in their common love of Christ who is their

²⁰ Ernst Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 75.
²¹ Edward A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Religion," THEOLOGY TODAY, XIV (October, 1957), pp. 385-400.

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common Savior. And when this spiritual unity is achieved or realized, then social differences-although still existing as a result of social institutions which partake of original sin-matter for little. What should be the basis for action is not the social differences but membership in the Church. As Marais points out,"²² the early Christians were joined in the deepest of spiritual bonds. The catacombs did not indicate whether those buried were freemen or slaves; the Christians felt their spiritual unity so much that they were buried not with their ancestral families but with their fellow believers, for these constituted their real families. Obviously, in this spiritual brotherhood divisions based on race, color, or economic considerations play no, or only an extremely insignificant part. These early Christians felt no need to criticize or attack the social system which produced social and racial differences, for in their faith and religious practices they had transcended these differences. These differences are those produced by the Kingdom of Caesar; they should not be mistaken for those of the Kingdom of God.

In conclusion, then, the ethical justification for abolishing or preserving the social system of racial segregation cannot be derived from practical considerations, nor from the evidence of the social sciences, nor even from theological reasons. But only Christian theology can offer the moral basis of race relations; it is only within the Church that racial differences can be transcended.

All of this implies that the believer must in the first instance regard members of the other race as fellow-sinners, to whom he may and must bring the message of Christ. And if these members of the other race are also themselves believers, he must consider them as brothers and sisters in Christ Jesus. It follows then that all differences, however important they may be in social life, become matters of secondary importance.²³

²² Op. cit., p. 6.
²³ Quoted in Marais, op. cit, p. 20.