Theology Today - Vol 36, No. 4 - January 1980 - BOOK REVIEW - Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief

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Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief
By Ronald M. Green
New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 303 pp. $12.00.

Our century has been marked by a dominant tendency in philosophical thought to set religion and reason either at odds or apart from one another. Both critics of religion, following the suggestions of Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud, and the positivists, for instance, and many defenders, pursuing the insights of selected existentialists and phenomenologists, have joined in separating religion from reason, either by proclaiming religion an empirical "misfit" or locating religion beyond the boundaries of reason.

But in Religious Reason, Ronald M. Green, a professor of religion at Dartmouth College, calls this separation boldly into question. Aiming to provide a constructive and convincing alternative to the contemporary effort to "distance religion from reason" (p. 247), Green sets out equipped with a masterful grasp of Kant's writings in ethical and religious theory-to show that "religion is a fully rational activity" (p. 4). Though not without difficulties, the result is a penetrating, erudite, and very discerning piece of work which should challenge contemporary approaches to religion and renew more probing and rigorous scholarship concerning the meaning and role of reason in religion.

In Part I of this book, Green, retracing and then moving beyond ground covered by Kant, carefully attempts to uncover the fundamental and universal structure of reason that underlies religion. Assuming that reason has progressively interrelated functions or "employments" ("theoretical," "prudential," "moral"), Green struggles to show reason's progression to what he labels its "religious employment" or "pure religious reason." Acknowledging that Kant's three commanding questions for philosophy (What can I know? What ought I to do? What

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can I hope?), nicely represent the progression in reason's concerns, Green vigorously contends that "the progression towards religious belief and activity takes place within the operations of reason and is a part of the conceptual structure of every rational agent" (p. 5). Moreover, religious beliefs are necessary for the resolution of reason's internal problems. That is to say, a rationally constituted morality must resort to some form of religious belief to render its conflicting dictates coherent (pp. 51-53).

For instance, in respect to the question "Why should I be moral?" the conflict between impartial reason's imperative that we recognize the absolute authority of the moral law, and our experiential awareness that moral obedience is not always accompanied by happiness, drives reason to postulate a series of supra-empirical religious beliefs in order to overcome that contradiction (e.g., the postulation of a "possibly real existence" of a perfectly moral causal agency that has supremacy over nature). In a similar manner, the question "How can I ever be morally worthy?" can only find its answer in reason's postulation of a perfect moral causal agency which, in its supremacy over all reality, "stands as the final objective ground and arbiter of moral worth" (pp. 99, 106). In this manner, reason affords one at least a minimal basis for believing that one's own condemnatory self-judgment is neither the only nor the ultimate basis for assessing one's own moral worth. So, religious belief, far from being hostile to reason, emerges as an expression of respect for reason's demands. It is first and foremost an effort to respond to the demands of the basic and universal structure of reason.

After attempting to consolidate his argument in the form of a systematic table of "the requirements of pure religious reason" (p. 109), Green proposes to investigate whether major historical religious systems exhibit a general adherence to those requirements and structure. This informed, intelligent, and well-researched investigation constitutes Part II of Green's book.

To test the conformity of actual religious traditions to the demands of reason, Green examines Judaism, Christianity, and the religions of India. Although he does not test systematically each tradition against every aspect of his table of requirements, he offers an engaging account of how some of the basic tensions of these major religions (e.g., between justice and mercy, between perfect morality and freedom) emerge from but are finally resolved through response to the needs and requirements of religious reason. And in each of these traditions, he discovers some of the characteristic moves of religious reason, perceives a straining towards the maximum fulfillment of reason's conflicting requirements, and sees the tradition's doctrines as conclusions of protracted and generally covert processes of moral reasoning (pp. 157, 196, 233). Without denying that religious traditions may draw upon satisfactions or experiences which are neither rational nor irrational, Green concludes that there is a common and essential rational program to

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which religions conform. Although no religious system is perfectly adequate, each one represents a specific solution to the problem of "weighting reason's requirements" in relation to the complex program of reason. Hence, religious faith is required to complete reason's program, however variegated the individual religious responses may be (pp.247-255).

I am persuaded that both Green's variant of the "moral argument" and his double-sided version of "applied religious reason" are important and merit the careful study of scholars and serious students of religion. But that is not to say that I am without criticism of Green's work. For one thing, I think that too much of Green's argument in Part 1, though painstaking and insightful, represents an interpretative reformulation of Kant's argument. As a consequence, at times, too much seems assumed rather than established, and many of Kant's problems remain Green's problems (e.g., do the conflicting "demands" of moral reason require or only suggest the affirmation of a "supreme moral causal agency"?). In addition, I'm inclined to see many parts of Green's argument in Part II as somewhat forced (e.g., pp. 126-128, 152, 175-176, 181, 217-218, 227, 238). Although Green shows the possible compatibility between the requirements of reason and many major beliefs of the traditions he examines, he fails to show that these beliefs are the inevitable outcome of religious reason's requirements. Indeed, at times his attempts to demonstrate that certain rational requirements are met by specific doctrines appear more as impositions than as fulfillments.

I leave this provocative book with other questions. Let me list just a sample. (1) On what basis, finally, can Green affirm with utmost confidence that the rabbis showed profound sensitivity to reason's complex requirements, or state unqualifiedly that Paul's doctrine of justification by faith alone grew out of "attention to the requirements of religious reason?" (p. 181). (2) Can devotees of Christianity, generally speaking, be satisfied with Green's interpretation of Christ as a symbol which, when "fully understood," represents "the effort to bring to fruition the program of religious reason begun by Judaism?" (p. 195). (3) Is religion, or any major religious tradition, or the development of new religious expressions, to be understood, finally, in terms of responsiveness to reason's needs and demands? (4) Are there not existential needs more basic than rational ones to which religion is a response? (5) Finally-to follow a query anticipated by the author-has Green, in advocating the basic and essential rationality of religion, missed what is distinctively "religious" about religion?

Ronald E. Santoni
Denison University
Granville, Ohio