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486 - Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes |
Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes
By Charles Hartshorne
Albany, State University of New York, 1984. 144 pp. $7.95.
The virtual dean of American philosophers here speaks his mind on religious issues, hoping thereby to help individuals who find absurdities in the idea of God with which they are familiar. It was a conversation with two such persons, in fact, which motivated this resume of his thought, composed in but five weeks. Those conditions and that motivation explain why the philosophical arguments invariably are marshalled in support of a thesis to be presented, and alternative readings of what he identifies as "the classical tradition" rarely find a voice. The result often sounds like a series of obiter dicta, by which Hartshorne's "middle way" emerges from two quite untenable extremes (pp. 38-40). That either of the extremes was ever held by any theologian or a-theologian (defenders of an atheistic alternative) could fairly be doubted. At least the author makes little effort to link particular names with specific theses.
The result is a list of intellectual preferences in matters religious, which are not themselves defended in great detail, and so thus take their plausibility from the extremes each one purports to mediate. That list would be familiar to those already acquainted with the movement called "process theology," one of whose promoters is of course Hartshorne. Perfection is reserved to the abstract aspect of deity; God's creative power is shared with creation itself. God's knowledge grows with history, responding to the novelties in creatures. One's "entire career, with all its concrete values, is an imperishable possession of deity" (p. 40), and revelation becomes "a help to our weak, uncertain, partial awareness of what God is" (p. 48). This evolutionary or "process" view of reality in
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488 - Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes |
the company of God is then developed in pan-psychic terms (mediating the mind/matter dualism), evolutionary creativity animated by divinity "as Soul of the cosmic body" (p. 79) and a love "that means fully grasping the good of others as therefore also divine good" (p. 120)--and hence beyond selfishness/unselfishness.
In each case (with the possible exception of this final characterization of God as love), the choices regarding a conceptuality for divinity are invariably made according to patterns and schemes that make sense to us. now. The arguments which are given simply bolster that orientation; they are never marshalled to justify it. That may also explain why nuanced theological positions on the various topics are never canvassed. In short, the best attempts of highly sophisticated religious traditions to articulate God's transcendence are simply not part of this field of inquiry. Instead, the crudest caricatures are presumed to depict the state of theology accurately, so that a more adequate alternative may emerge. As a result, nothing of the specific genius of particular religious traditions comes to the surface.
It would probably be a good idea were every major thinker to offer us a work like this one--clearly displaying what has motivated the intellectual preferences so evident in his philosophical work to date. We would then have-the opportunity to ask ourselves whether our predilections are any better grounded, and learn-at least by indirection-how we might argue for the positions we find ourselves taking, rather than upholding them in reaction to ill-stated counter-positions.
David B. Burrell, C.S.C.
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana