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The Decalogue As Morality and Ethics
By Kenneth C. Bailey

THESIS: One reason why it is difficult to convince modern man of his sinfulness and need of grace is the widespread failure to distinguish care fully enough between morality and ethics, between formal and material ethical rules. The theologian tends to speak the language of the former, and the layman of the latter; and confusion results because they often do not realize that the two languages are quite different. This essay at tempts to make the difference clear with reference to the Ten Commandments, and to use this distinction to show that there is no paradox in holding both that man is sinful and that he may never the less be thoroughly ethical.

One of the most enduring puzzles of theology, and to philosophers with a religious interest, is that of the -relation between grace and works. Most men, whether Christian or not, believe that what they do must have something to do with determining their fate. What a man does, for instance how he treats his associates, has a great deal to do with his success or failure in his business or profession. Indeed, it is a pretty general fact that whether a per son is happy or miserable in his relations with his fellows depends in large measure upon how he behaves toward them. It is not at all surprising that this general fact about man's mundane existence is easily extended into his religious life, so that it becomes natural for him to suppose that his acts contribute to his spiritual welfare as well. To put the matter in religious terminology, it appears natural enough for a man to suppose that his works have something to do, even though it may be little, with his salvation. The contrary, and in

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some quarters more acceptable, view is that salvation is purely a matter of grace because man, being depraved, is unable to do anything under his own power that is even worthy of praise, much less the reward of salvation. The difficulty arises, it seems to me, when the theologian tries to convince the ordinary man that he is sinful and in need of the grace of God, when the patent fact is that the majority of men are rigorously law-abiding.

Theologians are sometimes, and understandably, accused of talking nonsense when they speak of man's sinfulness and need of grace. The nonsensical appearance of their talk arises because they often try to maintain two apparently contradictory assertions, namely that even though a man may abide by the law in every detail he may yet be thoroughly sinful. If a man is able, as he often is, to abide by the law by dint of his own efforts, what need has he of grace? The paradox is further confounded by the fact that theologians often try to maintain both that man, because of his original sin, is incapable of doing anything good on his own, and that nevertheless he ought to try to become better than he now is. What kind of sense does it make to maintain that even though a man is unable to do anything good he nevertheless ought to try? If a man is totally depraved and simply unable to do anything good, then there clearly is no value, beyond that of mere lip service, in telling him that he ought to do something better than he is now doing. When the apparent absurdity of the theologians' contradictory claims is put together with the fact that men often do a great deal of good, is it any wonder that it is difficult to convince modern man of his sinfulness and need for grace?

That there is a confusion present here is obvious, but it is not so commonly understood that the reason for the confusion is often our failure to understand that the theologian and the ordinary man have two radically different considerations in mind. When the theologian claims that man is sinful and depraved, he is speaking in the context of morality. When the ordinary man maintains that he is able to do many good things, he is speaking in the context of ethics. The purpose of this essay is to attempt to clear up the confusion by pointing out the crucial difference between morality and ethics. Putting the matter in a slightly different way, what I hope to show is that observance or non-observance of a set of rules, such as the Ten Commandments, has nothing whatever to do with morality or con-

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viction of sin. Put this baldly, I will candidly admit that the idea seems strange at first since, in our culture, relatively few people are free of the confusion that is the central concern of this essay, but on continued acquaintance I believe that the distinction between morality and ethics resolves many of the pressing problems in this area and that it accords well with both theological and ordinary usages. It would be very easy, of course, to make my point by defining the terms "morality" and "ethics" in the appropriate manner, but this is not my intention. Rather I intend to show that the Christian conception of the good life involves two quite different types of statement, both of them indispensable. The first I prefer to associate with morality, because it deals with the character of the person rather than with the character of his acts. The second I prefer to associate with ethics, because it deals with the character of the person's acts rather than with his character as a person. However, the labels do not matter particularly. What does matter is that there is an essential, and very important, difference between an imperative like "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Rom. 13: 9) and one like "Thou shalt not kill" (Exod. 20: 13).

I

The Christian conception of the good life, insofar as it has any distinctive character at all, is based upon the first type of imperative rather than upon the second. There is nothing unusual about the set of rules that we have inherited from the Mosaic tradition, except the fact that they have been remarkably pervasive in Western society. Every society has its set of rules, however, and the differences between the various sets are not as great as one might expect, due, no doubt, to the simple fact that respect for life and property are necessary if any society is to survive. The meaning of such rules is generally quite clear, and it is the task of the courts to make them clear when they are vague or ambiguous. Therefore, there is in practice little doubt as to the meaning of injunctions against murder or theft, al though it is clearly true that there may be borderline cases wherein it is difficult to decide whether a person has or has not committed robbery or murder. The fact that there are borderline cases, how ever, is beside the point. The essential point is that murder and theft may be defined by law as precisely as we wish, or as the courts of law find necessary or useful. Whatever ambiguity or vagueness

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attaches to injunctions against murder or theft is therefore not logically necessary, since we can, and as a matter of fact do make such in junctions as clear as we find necessary or convenient. We know quite well when to classify behavior as falling in the category of murder or of theft. But how is one to know when to classify behavior as falling in the category of loving one's neighbor as oneself?

This question leads directly to the heart of the matter, namely the distinction between formal rules of behavior and material rules. In general we are quite familiar with formal rules, particularly in the sciences, in mathematics, and in logic, but we are much less familiar with the importance of formal rules in making judgments about the goodness or badness of behavior. A formal rule is one which is valid independently of any specific subject matter, its meaning being derived entirely from the logical structure of the context in which it is applied. An example taken from logic is the familiar "law of excluded middle" which states merely that, given any proposition whatsoever, it must be either true or false. The key to the formal nature of this so-called "law" lies in the phrase "given any proposition whatsoever," which is meant to imply that the principle holds for any universe of discourse whatsoever, or, in other words, that its validity is independent of any particular subject matter.¹ Any discipline involves a number of such rules, wherein they constitute merely decisions to use concepts or terms in a certain way. Their function is to provide the logical form or structure which gives order and sys tematic meaning to the subject matter of the discipline. But they do not determine what that subject matter is to be. A mathematician, for example, provides us with a set of rules that may be used in computing the area, say, of a plane figure, but he cannot, qua mathematician, determine what quantities are to be substituted for the variables in his formulae in any given case. Thus the mathematical formulae are useful in discovering the answer to our problem only in the sense that they indicate how the various data may be related to each other. By themselves they provide no answer at all, as far as the area of a given plane figure is concerned.

The area of ethical discourse, like any other discipline, is subject to certain formal rules. In the first place, there are those rules which apply to the use of language in every context. Thus it is as impor-

¹ The purely formal character of this law may also be shown by the fact that it can be ex pressed symbolically as [(pvp') (p.p')'], read "either 'p' is true or 'p' is false, but not both," and where "p" stands for any proposition whatsoever.

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tant, if one wishes to make sense at all, to avoid contradicting oneself in this area as it is in any other. That such rules apply here as well as anywhere else is quite beyond serious question, but it is not with these particular formal rules that we are presently concerned. What I wish to show is that moral injunctions like "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" and "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" (Matt. 7: 12) are formal rules, which give order and structure to our ethical discourse but which, by themselves, never solve an ethical problem. The point is, I think, quite easily made. Rules such as these, called "categorical imperatives" by Immanuel Kant, are universal in the sense that, if one accepts the Christian conception of the good life, they admit of no exceptions whatsoever. The Christian is always, in all circumstances, under the obligation to treat his neighbor as he himself would wish to be treated. Thus the rule "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is independent of circum stances, in precisely the same sense as the law of excluded middle was seen to be independent of its context. But, just as the formal proposition [(pvp') (p.p')'] is useless until some meaning is given to the variable "p," so the rule "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is useless until it has been interpreted in terms of the concrete situation facing the individual who is required to make an ethical decision. The formal rule by itself will never make an ethical decision for one. This point can be made clear by considering a hypothetical case.

Suppose a man borrows a shotgun from a friend on the firm promise to return it within one week. Suppose, further, that during the time the borrower has the shotgun, the friend from whom he borrowed it becomes psychotic and threatens harm to his family and others. When the specified period of time expires, the borrower is faced with the problem of whether to return the shotgun or not. Superficially the example is trite, because I suspect that no one would recommend returning the shotgun in face of the fact that the man from whom he borrowed it, now psychotic, would be likely to use it to harm himself or others. Yet the example is cogent because it illustrates the kind of opposition that may arise between imperatives like "Always keep your promises" and the individual's concern for others. Clearly here is a case in which keeping one's promise might very well have disastrous consequences. What should our hypothetical borrower do in this case? Perhaps he suddenly remembers, that, as a Christian, he is obligated to love his neighbor as himself.

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True, but this principle does not help him to decide whether to return the shotgun or not, but rather it encourages him to do whatever he believes best expresses his love and concern under these particular circumstances. In other words, the principle encourages him to do whatever he honestly believes is right under these circumstances, but the principle does not tell him just what the right action under these circumstances is! He, in his role as ethical agent, must make the decision for himself. The principle does not decide the issue for him. Furthermore, he cannot escape moral responsibility for making the decision himself, because the practical rule "Always keep your promises," which normally binds us to abide by the promises we have made, in this case is superseded by a higher moral principle which indicates that under these particular circumstances, keeping one's promise would be morally wrong!

To summarize, the above case-and it is very easy to construct any number of others like it-indicates that a moral principle like "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is a formal principle. It states the primary obligation of the Christian, regardless of what the particular circumstances might be. It is obligatory always and independently of circumstances, but it does not present a ready-made solution to the ethical problem. Rather, its function is to indicate the spirit in which the decision, whatever it is under the circumstances, must be made. The individual must make the decision, and he must be held responsible for doing what he honestly believes to be right under these circumstances. By now the point ought to be clear enough. Morality, for the Christian, consists precisely in doing whatever he honestly believes is right. We cannot insist that his behavior must be thus and so, for we have no way of knowing what he himself honestly believes is right under these particular circum stances. Only he, and presumably God, are competent to decide whether his behavior is moral, for only these are able to decide whether his actual behavior is consistent with what he believes to be right. This, and only this, is the essence of morality: behavior consistent with what one honestly believes to be right!

II

It is now time to consider practical or material imperatives like "Thou shalt not kill." Christian societies have traditionally recog-

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nized the Ten Commandments as obligations laid upon them. They are obligatory, certainly, but in a quite different sense from the obligations that attaches to the formal principles. They are obligatory because no society can survive unless it somehow protects the per sons and property of its citizens. But practical principles, though they are necessary to good order within a society, are not necessary in the logical sense. They are not independent of circumstances. A set of practical rules of conduct, whether it be the Ten Commandments or any other code of laws, is dependent upon circumstances, and we must therefore be ready to make any adjustments in it that changing conditions may demand. We have already seen that one practical principle, namely "Always keep your promise," does admit of exceptions, for there are circumstances under which it would be morally wrong to keep one's promise. This is characteristic of practical principles. They are not necessary in the sense that it is possible to conceive of circumstances under which it would be morally wrong to insist that they be followed.

To illustrate this general characteristic of practical ethical principles it would be well to consider the Ten Commandments in some what greater detail. In the first place, it should be noted that not all of the Ten Commandments belong in the same general context. The first commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" (Exod. 20: 3), belongs in a theological rather than ethical context. It does not specify a type of behavior, but emphasizes the fact that Christianity and Judaism are monotheistic religions, and hence cannot permit their adherents to substitute other forms in place of worship of the Judeo-Christian God. The second commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain" (Exod. 20: 7), is similar to the formal principles discussed above. By itself it does not specify a particular form of behavior, but rather it indicates the attitude with which the believer properly ought to employ the name of God. Its formal character is illustrated by the fact that Luther, as well as others, felt it necessary to interpret the commandment in terms of practical prohibitions against cursing and so on. It is clear that the interpretation given the commandment by Luther does not possess the same authority as does the commandment itself. Precisely similar remarks, mutatis mutandis, might be made regarding the third and fourth commandments. They do not specify particular forms of behavior, but indicate the attitude the believer

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properly ought to have toward the Sabbath and toward his parents, respectively.

The balance of the commandments belong to a strictly ethical con text, unlike the first four. They are practical rules of conduct, de signed to promote stability within society, but they are not necessary in the sense that it is quite easy to conceive of situations in which it would be wrong to insist upon them. The fifth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is a classic example. Some interpreters, supposing that the commandment was to be taken as universally applicable, have been forced into the paradoxical situation of supposing that respect for the lives of their enemies required them to sacrifice the lives of their family and friends. But the pacifist can hardly maintain seriously that there are absolutely no circumstances under which it would be right to take the life of another human being. If, for instance, we had refused to resist the military actions of Nazi Germany under the delusion that it would be wrong to take the life of a cruel and sadistic murderer, that decision in all likelihood would have cost the lives of many thousands of innocent people, whose lives were surely of as great value in the eyes of God as were the lives of the Nazi legions. Clearly, to refuse to take the life of a potential murderer under the delusion that his life is intrinsically more valuable than the life of his victim, is a mockery of the ethical intent of the fifth commandment. Certainly the commandment is not to be taken lightly. No doubt all alternatives other than physical force ought to be resorted to first, but if they fail, and there appears no way to prevent aggression other than by physical force, then it would be ethically wrong to refuse to employ all the force at our command. To put the point simply, there are times when it is right to take the life of another human being, and when it would be ethically wrong to refuse to do so.

The sixth commandment presents a slightly more difficult problem, but not much more so. Sexual chastity is a highly emotive subject, so it is easy to imagine that any suggestion that under certain circumstances adultery would be ethically right will be met with many a raised eyebrow. But suppose, to take a not-so-extreme example, that a man and a woman, each the husband or wife of an other, were cast away upon an island, with little or no hope of rescue. It would be ridiculous to suppose that it would be ethically wrong for them to cohabitate, even without benefit of clergy! As long as

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society remains relatively stable, it makes very good sense to regulate the sexual behavior of people, but when circumstances no longer demand sexual chastity, it would be a mockery of the purpose of the commandment to insist upon it. In a case such as this the decision whether to live together as husband and wife could not be made by appealing to the sixth commandment, but only by asking that the man and woman concerned do as they sincerely believe to be right under the circumstances. Certainly it is unlikely, in this day and age, that a situation such as this would ever arise, but this is quite beside the point. The point is that it is possible to conceive of a situation in which it would be ethically wrong to insist upon the sixth commandment, and the possibility of one single instance when insisting upon sexual chastity would be wrong is sufficient to demonstrate that the commandment is not universal. This is all that I wish to maintain.

Now that the pattern has been established, the balance of the commandments may quickly be dealt with. The seventh commandment, "Thou shalt not steal" (Exod. 20: 15), is clearly meant to establish respect for property and the right of ownership. But it does not imply that property and ownership are more important than any other consideration. If a situation were to arise in which the only alternatives were taking another's property without permission, stealing if you will, and starvation, the only proper ethical course is clear. Property is indeed important, but it is not more important than life. If the only alternative to starvation is theft, then stealing another's property is clearly right. Granted, again, that such extreme situations do not often arise, but the essential point is that it is easy to conceive of a situation in which stealing would be right, and this is sufficient to establish that the seventh commandment does admit of exceptions in principle. Therefore, it is not a universal imperative, but depends for its validity upon circumstances.

The ninth commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house," and the tenth, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor's" (Exod. 20: 17), likewise are intended to establish respect for the property and household of another. Probably it should be noted that the tenth commandment sounds a bit strange to modern ears, for we are not accustomed to thinking of wives or servants as property, but it is no doubt sound to interpret the com-

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mandment as meaning that we ought, insofar as is practical, to leave our neighbor in peace. But there are times when we cannot leave our neighbor in peace. If his status can be maintained only at the expense of social injustice to other people, then justice demands that he be denied the right to maintain servants in favor of at least a reasonable standard of living for others. This fact is recognized by all modern societies that attempt a reasonably just distribution of wealth.

Finally, the eighth commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false wit ness against thy neighbor" (Exod. 20: 16), is in general an injunction against lying or perjury. Certainly it is extremely important that people respect the truth, for if we could not, in general, depend upon the truthfulness of other people, the result would be social chaos. Yet there clearly are cases in which it is our obligation not to tell the truth. During wartime, for example, it is a soldier's proper duty to deceive the enemy by any means at his command, because telling the truth could conceivably cost the lives of many of his comrades and perhaps result in defeat of his cause. Other cases could easily be mentioned in which it would be clearly wrong to tell the truth, and right not to tell the truth. Again, the possibility of a single instance in which it would be wrong to insist upon following the commandment is sufficient to indicate that the commandment is not absolute but dependent upon circumstances.

III

The heart of the case is now completed. It remains only to indicate the consequences of the distinction between formal moral principles like "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and practical ethical principles like "Thou shalt not kill." The moral character of the person depends upon whether his behavior is consistent with his beliefs, with what he sincerely believes to be right. As far as this consideration is concerned, the consequences of his behavior are immaterial. Inasmuch as I am convinced that society has no right to determine what a man shall believe, I am similarly convinced that society is in no position to judge the moral character of a man's acts. Only the individual himself and, the Christian believes, God can be in the position to judge the moral character of a man. At first this point may seem a bit strange, for it implies that one cannot judge the moral character of even an Adolf Hitler. One may certainly judge that his behavior was rash, ill-considered, stupid, contrary to estab-

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lished law, and so on, but one cannot judge that Hitler was immoral, since we are not in a position to decide whether his behavior was consistent with his beliefs. Strange as this consequence may seem, it is consistent with the Christian view, for Christians have generally held that no man is competent to judge the moral character of another. This prerogative is God's alone.

The case is quite different when practical imperatives are considered. It clearly is the state's right to regulate the behavior of its citizens in the interest of peace, harmony, justice, and stability. To this end, codes of law such as the Ten Commandments are established and the state requires that its citizens abide by them. These codes of law are not absolute, for as societies change, the laws which govern them must change too. To require a changing society to abide by an unchanging code of law inevitably results in difficult situations wherein the individual, in order to make a rational, intelligent decision based upon changing circumstances, is forced to break the law in order to fulfill the demands of higher, formal, moral principles. The example of the Pharisees of Christ's time is tragic not because they obeyed the law, which is every citizen's duty so long as it can be done in conscience, but because they had abdicated their individual moral responsibility and depended upon rigid laws to make their ethical decisions for them. In other words, they had become slaves to the law, and could not understand that the law must be made to conform to the changing needs of man in a changing society. The Christian's vaunted freedom from the law comes down to this, recognition, as Jesus put it, that the law was made for man and not man for the law! What could this mean other than that it is a travesty of justice and good sense to suppose that the code of laws formulated by ancient Judaic society must necessarily apply in its original form to all subsequent forms of society? The Jews are to be respected very highly, indeed, for their insight into the fact that respect for persons and property is necessary to the good order of society, but we need not suppose that the expression they gave these principles must remain forever unchanged. The demands of modern society require that decisions be made according to circum stances, and we cannot bind ourselves to an ancient code of laws that was never intended to apply to a complex society such as we know today. I do not, of course, recommend that we abandon the Ten Commandments, for the principles they express are basic to our so-

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ciety, but if and when considerations of Christian love demand a breach of a literal interpretation of the Mosaic law, no guilt feelings are required. For this is precisely what Jesus meant. The principle of Christian love is logically prior to its expression through the law, and when the law fails, as it occasionally does, to express that principle, then it is only reasonable to adjust the law to conform to the principle of which it is the expression.

We are now in a position to return to the problem with which this essay began, the apparently paradoxical belief that although man is basically sinful, he nevertheless ought and is able to improve his ways of behaving. The paradox is only apparent, and not real, because the two beliefs a) that man is basically a sinful being, and b) that man nevertheless can and ought to behave in an ethical manner, are not logically contradictory. They can be, and perhaps are in fact, both true because they apply to completely different contexts, of morals and ethics respectively. When the Christian believes that he is able, apparently on his own, to do many good things, he is perfectly right. He is able to do good acts, or bad ones, in the sense that he is free to abide by the code of laws established by his society or to refuse to abide by it. It makes perfectly good sense to enjoin a person to improve his behavior in the interest of peace and harmony within society. It is for this reason that society quite properly insists upon the right to require conformity to the law, to punish its infringement, and to maintain correctional institutions for the purpose of restraining or rehabilitating those who will not or can not conform. This right of society is not arbitrary, however. The Christian character of a society is determined by the extent to which its laws express the formal principle of Christian love.

At the same time, however, a person's conformity or non-conformity to the laws of society has nothing whatever to do with the question of his justification before God, because it has nothing to do with his moral character. As we have seen, a man's moral character depends only upon whether or not his behavior is consistent with what he honestly believes to be right, and this question society is in no position to decide. The Christian doctrine of depravity means simply that no man always does that which he believes to be right. In appearance, this is an empirical claim, although an odd one for it is difficult to know how to go about obtaining the evidence necessary to establish its probability. The relation be-

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tween a man's beliefs and his behavior seems to be of the sort that can be observed, if at all, only by the individual himself. Yet the insights of modern psychiatry lead us to suspect that people are very often unaware themselves of the motives for their acts. Perhaps it is more significant to say that the belief that no man always does what he honestly believes to be right is an article of faith, which has some ground in empirical fact but can never be conclusively established. No doubt the best evidence for such a claim lies in each person's own awareness that some, and perhaps most, of his acts are inconsistent with his beliefs. Hence, although in form it appears to be an empirical claim, probably the final significance of the Christian insistence upon the depravity of all men lies in its ability to awaken each of us to the fact that he is, if he honestly examines his own motives to the best of his ability, guilty before God. As far as man's justification before God is concerned, how ever, the only competent judge is God. If one is careful to point out that the belief that man is basically sinful is entirely independent of whether or not he is guilty of having broken the law, there should be less difficulty than there usually is in convincing man of his sinfulness before God and his need of redemption.