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Historical Events and Ethical Decisions
By J. Milic Lochman

"During the second half of the twentieth century it has become absolutely clear that 'everything is connected with everything else.' An explosion on the other side of the globe which would not have concerned us at all fifty years ago now has direct repercussions on our own lives. This is particularly clear in relation to the question of peace and war: on this planet we are all in the same boat. Whereas for thousands of years the primary problem facing mankind has been how to control nature, today our primary problem is history, or more specifically, how to control the future history of mankind."

The question of the importance of historical events for our ethical and political decisions is one of the most urgent and most discussed problems of theology today. For all of us world history has become an almost inevitable destiny. Of course it is true that in the past also people were bound by their particular historical circumstances. That is one of the conditions of human life at any time: no one chooses the time and place in which his life will be passed. He enters a situation which is to a large extent already ordered. We are members of a certain race, a certain nation, a certain class, a certain church. We inherit the rich heritage of our forefathers-but also their sin and their guilt.

Today, however, this general situation has become far more acute. Never before has human life been woven so completely into the intricate web of world events. In former times people could live within the comparatively narrow limits of their tribe, their town, their country, which were seldom directly affected by the events of world history. Today this is no longer possible. During the sec-

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ond half of the twentieth century it has become absolutely clear that "everything it connected with everything else." An explosion on the other side of the globe which would not have concerned us at all fifty years ago now has direct repercussions on our own lives. This is particularly clear in relation to the question of peace and war: on this planet we are all in the same boat. Whereas for thousands of years the primary problem facing mankind has been how to control nature, today our primary problem is history, or more specifically, how to control the future history of mankind. The question of the significance of historical events for our decisions is therefore extremely urgent. Moreover, it is, among present-day theologians, a hotly debated question. Let us try to indicate the field of discussion by pointing out two typical schools of thought.

I

(1)A realization of the decisive power of history over our lives may at first stimulate attempts to formulate a philosophy of history or a theology of history. This is the classic line of theological thinking about history. It was the Bible (especially the prophets of the Old Testament) which first showed mankind that the stage of world history is the decisive scene where our decisions must be made. Nearly all of the religions of antiquity were directed towards nature-mythology; the philosophy of antiquity was strongly metaphysical and transcendental in its orientation, seeking truth, meaning, and reality beyond time and history. But the prophets and the apostles emphatically draw attention to this world and its history as the sphere in which God deals with his people, in which he brings forth Jesus Christ as his ultimate act of salvation, and in which he will maintain his loyalty until the end of history.

Of course, the Bible does not work out an abstract, general philosophy of history. It has little interest in the course of world history as such. Its whole attention is concentrated upon the history of the covenant, the history of salvation. But the light of this history-which takes place within world history and which ultimately means the salvation of all nations and of all men-falls also upon the whole history of the world and of the nations. They too are in the hand of the one God; the cross stands above them too; God's ultimate purpose is also their purpose. So the message of the Bible always provides a stimulus to examine the course and the meaning

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of history, including those trends of thought where the strict concentration upon the Heilsgechichte has become generalized and secularized. The biblical background can be clearly traced in all the past philosophies of history, including those which are deliberately non-Christian.

The great time for philosophy of history, both in the church and in the world, was probably the nineteenth century. Schleiermacher, the great father of nineteenth-century Protestant theology, called theology and the church to develop a philosophy of history: "History is . . . the loftiest object of religion; religion begins with history and ends with history."¹ History is "the profoundest, most universal revelation" of what is deepest and holiest. The greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century-Hegel and Marx-were also the greatest philosophers of history. Hegel regarded it as sheer lack of faith if the Church did not venture upon a philosophy of history, for "Christians are initiated into God's mysteries, and this gives us also the key to world history."² So these attempts were ventured upon, both in the church and in the world. Many people who lost their faith in the Christian Heilsgeschichte retained their faith in history as the ultimate religion.³

As a result of the terrible catastrophes of the two world wars, this faith was shattered. So also were other types of philosophy of history, such as the American Social Gospel with its faith in the progressive attainment of the kingdom of God through the democratic ordering of modern society. Nevertheless, despite all these blows, the philosophy of history is far from dead. Even in Germany, some of the younger theologians have recently been trying to revive the nineteenth-century traditions of a philosophy of history, and to carry it further, as is indicated by the somewhat ambiguous slogans about "revelation as history" (Wolfhart Pannenberg and his friends).

II

(2)In opposition to the old and the new philosophy of history and theology of history, the twentieth century has produced an increas-

¹ Addresses on Religion, Second Address.
² Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. Hoffmeister, p. 46.
³ Cf. Burckhardt, Dilthey, Croce, and Troeltsch. See K. Mwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen, p. 176f.: "The modern over-appreciation of history, and of 'the world' as 'history,' is the outcome of our estrangement from the natural theology of antiquity, and from the supernatural theology of Christianity." "Faith in the absolute relevance of history, which has made the books of Spengler and Toynbee best-sellers, has been brought about by the emancipation of the modem view of history from its original limitation by classical cosmology and by Christian theology."

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ingly strong tendency to mistrust history. This mistrust does not spring simply from the destruction of faith in the great philosophies of history, owing to the shattering events of our time. It springs also (and this is its strength) from a protest against the "wearier" forms of confidence in history, especially against relativistic historicism, which regards the truth merely as a predicate of changing history. It springs also from despair (and this is perhaps its weakness), despair about the course of contemporary history. This type of theological view of the events of history assumes many different forms. But I will confine myself to the form which has had the most influence: the theology of Rudolf Bultmann.

Bultmann's philosophy of history is based on the work of Martin Heidegger. According to him, the essence of history is "historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit). The whole attention of this philosophy is concentrated upon this essence of history, upon my "historicity" as the essential structure of existence rather than upon history as a process of individual and collective events. Heidegger pronounces this latter aspect of history to be "the common places of vulgar history," and our involvement with it as a failure to perceive our real nature, forgetting what we really are and concentrating our attention on "the common places of Mr. Everyman." The philosophy of world history is a false flight from death: "All history calculates what the future will be like, on the basis of certain views of the past. History is the constant destruction of the future."⁴

The ideas of Rudolf Bultmarm follow the same lines. He too starts with the essence of history which he finds in the Geschichtlichkeit of human nature, in human temporality. Man always lives in the future; his real life is always before him; he is always on the way to what he wants to be. The essential thing is always to attain the real nature of that future, and not to miss it. That is the meaning of human history, and the meaning of history altogether. For ultimately there is no real history beyond my Geschichtlichkeit. Our thought and our action must therefore be concentrated upon that and solely upon that. The man who complains that he cannot see any meaning in history, and that his own life therefore has no meaning either because it is interwoven with history must be told: "Don't look around you at the history of the world; look into your own personal history. The meaning of history is always present with

⁴ Holzwege, p. 301.

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you; you cannot look at it as a spectator; you can only see it by making responsible decisions. Every moment contains the dormant possibility of being the eschatological moment. You must awaken it."⁵

Bultmann argues as a theologian, and his view of history is expressed as a Christian, eschatological view. He must therefore work the biblical motives into his own concept, especially the prophetic view which regards the events of history also as signs of God's judgment and of his mercy. How can he do this? Bultmann takes his stand on the thesis that a sublimation of the prophets' theology of history into existential Geschichtlichkeit corresponds, on all essential points, to the message of the Bible itself. Whereas the prophets regarded history as the scene of God's concrete action, this belief was later sublimated (in apocalyptic thought) into mythology and metaphysics. Apocalyptism was then still further removed from this world. Thus we are pointed in the direction of existential interpretation. Bultmann insists on this existentialization. My own existence is the only point to which my decisions in history are related: "In the decision of faith I decide not for a responsible action, but for a new understanding of myself as a man freed from himself by God's grace and given back to himself anew, in order to live by the grace of God."⁶ The history of the world does not concern the Christian at all, at any rate not directly. This applies already to the work of Christ: "The coming of Christ is an event in the Kingdom of Eternity, which is incommensurable in relation to historical time." It applies also to our own life and action: "In his faith the Christian is a contemporary of Christ; time and world-history are superseded."⁷

The two different Christian concepts of history which we have outlined give two quite different answers to our question of the significance of historical events for ethical decisions. In fact they are diametrically opposed. The "philosophy of history" concept regards the events of history as supremely important in relation to ethical decisions. This applies especially to the religious form of this philosophy: if history is really Heilsgeschichte, then it is absolutely crucial to recognize the kairos of history and to seize it. For a genuine decision can be taken only in relation to this kairos,

5 Geschichte und Eschatologie, p. 181.
6 Ibid., p. 191.
7 Ibid, p. 82.

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recognizing truly the "logic of history" and actively adapting itself to the necessity of history. Volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt. Tertium non datur. For our own action, therefore, it is essential to decipher the signs of the times. It is they which decide even what is good and what is bad, for what is good is what corresponds with the course of history. But the historical situation is also ethically decisive for the "wearier" forms of philosophy of history: if truth is a predicate of history, and if history is the beginning and the end, then the course of history is our final hope and our final point of relation. We must act in accordance with history. So the philosophy of history takes the events of history very seriously.

It is quite different when history is existentially transformed into Geschichtlichkeit. This regards the events of history as quite unimportant. They are a sea of chaos, and it really is not worthwhile to take an interest in them. The only thing which may be profitable for our ethical decisions is the attempt to perceive a new meaning in the processes of history, "as long as the pressure and the conflicts continue, under which the Christian has to purify his soul." So it is quite logical that Bultmann regards it as one of the two main temptations of the Protestant Church today, that it is clearly and concretely taking political action in contemporary history. Of course, Bultmann admits that the Christian has a political responsibility, but it concerns not so much his faith as his reason and his personal judgment. "It is the duty of theology and of the Church to point out his responsibility in its preaching. But it is not the task of theology and of the Church to draw up political rules and thus relieve the individual of responsibility for his own decisions."⁸ Our decisions of faith have nothing to do directly with the events of history. It is characteristic of Bultmann that he regards the course of world history as somewhat disastrous and catastrophic. Faced by the events of contemporary history men and women realize not only their dependence on those events, but also their own helplessness. They feel that they are not only involved in the history of the world, but that they are at its mercy.⁹ There is a certain nostalgia in this concept of history.

Both views of history are put forward as "Christian." Yet they are contradictory. This is a warning not to base our ethical deci-

⁸ Glauben und Verstehen, III, p. 196.
⁹ Ibid, pp. 2 f.

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sions on one of these views alone. They are a Scylla and Charybdis between which we must steer our course. Both fall short of the biblical view.

We can detect their shortcomings if we compare them with the main emphases of the Bible's message. The biblical view of history seems to me to be marked by two perceptions, which may be summed up in the pregnant phrase: Hominum confusione et Dei providentia historia regitur.¹⁰ Both must be taken seriously: the Bible is well acquainted with "human confusion," with history as the sphere of human freedom and human guilt. But in defiance of all this confusion the Bible attests its firm faith in the omnipotence of God, even in history. God has not abandoned history. This is a statement of faith not a principle of one's own philosophy of history. But as a statement of faith it is the power of the Christian life. So the Christian lives in history. He regards human confusion quite soberly. He believes quite soberly in God's providence. "We are living in the penultimate-we believe in the ultimate." This phrase taken from Bonhoeffer's Ethik applies also to our decisions in face of history.

Both views of history mentioned fall short of this biblical view. The philosophy of history certainly understands something about human confusion; but is it not in danger of underestimating it, and thus impairing the boundary between the ultimate and the penultimate? The existential view of history certainly understands about God's providence; but is it not in danger of separating it completely from our human history, thus leaving us in despair? The two things are inseparable. In my own view, it is only against this background that the question of the significance of historical events for our ethical and political decisions can be given a proper theological basis.

II

Our view of history as a sphere "ruled by divine providence and formed by human confusion" seems to me to lead to important consequences for our basic ethical attitude in face of history.

In the first place, this view of history helps to resolve the dilemma as to whether political decisions are "decisions of faith" or merely " questions of judgment." As is well known, this question is being

¹⁰ For the biblical-theological basis for this view of world history, I should like to draw attention especially to Karl Barth's discussion in Kirchliche Dogmatik, IV, 3/2, pp. 784-825.

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vigorously debated by German and Continental theologians today. If one presupposes either of the non-biblical concepts of history outlined above, it is fairly clear what answer will be given to this question. A philosophy of history regards decision in face of history as a matter of faith. If history is a divine revelation (direct or indirect), it calls for a corresponding attitude, an attitude of faith. According to the existential concept, however, history is a factor which is irrelevant to theology, and our attitude to the events of history is a question of purely rational judgment. Ultimately faith has nothing to do with history. In the secular sphere of history faith at most emphasizes our responsibility in principle, but it cannot give concrete guidance. That is only in the power of reason and judgment.

According to the biblical concept of history indicated, both answers must be judged inadequate. If history is a sphere of "human confusion," then the events of history must really be considered with extreme soberness. We must not be too hasty in proclaiming "judgments of faith" in the confusion of human quarrels. We must not be too ready to "preach," where the immediate need is to have a clear grasp of the facts. Most important of all, we must not claim that our own limited view is "the Christian view" and make our political differences into religious or metaphysical fronts. Our views must not assume the character of a "last judgment;" our quarrels must not be carried on as if they were crusades. There is constant justification here for Bultmann's concern in emphasizing the sober, logical, reflective aspect of our views of history. But in my opinion this concern is made into an absolute, and this is not justifiable. Of course, we are living in the penultimate and should think and argue accordingly (i.e., rationally). But we believe in the ultimate; amid all the relativities of historical events, amid all logical considerations, our faith is not dumb. Wherever we encounter man, there faith must speak. This does not mean that reason is simply excluded. In this respect it is not a choice of either faith or reason; nor is it a question of choosing between "human confusion" and "divine providence." On the contrary: faith calls for logical thought; but it is faith which calls. Faith is not neutral; it is "partial." Following in the steps of Jesus, faith takes sides with man, and appeals to reason to seek in this direction. So our ethical decisions in face of history must not be understood "enthusiastically"

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as bare decisions of faith, nor dualistically as bare questions of judgment. They must be understood in the unity of the obedient life which tries to act in faith and in the light of reason (without separating them).

If history stands under God's providence, or to express it in clearer theological terms, if history is the place where Jesus Christ accepted our human lot in complete solidarity, in which he became our contemporary in history, and "dwelt among us" (John 1: 14), then it must be taken with great seriousness also as our place.

Our place in history is not a matter of chance; it is not a matter of indifference; it is not a side show imposing no responsibility upon us, and which we can change at will. It is our unique opportunity entrusted to us here and now. We have no other. And it is also the scene of our vocation, the actual scene of our concrete responsibility, the only one we have, in which we must either acquit ourselves of our vocation or fall. All that sounds rather commonplace, but it is by no means a truism. For it is so easy to miss that opportunity, and so many people do so. Some people are always behind. They come limping after, always longing for the past. And others are impatient with the present time; they are already living in the dreams of their future. Both these types of people are in danger of missing the opportunities of the present, their concrete tasks, the people around them, their actual occupation. And how easy it is for people to miss the concrete opportunities of their calling. Discontented with their lot, they long for a different one, and dream of other opportunities; or else they withdraw into themselves and become embittered and defiant. All that is humanly understandable in certain situations. But from the Christian point of view it is not justifiable. "It is here, and not in any other place, that God's call must be perceived and His commandment fulfilled. Loyalty to Him requires loyalty also to one's place in life."¹¹

All this applies especially to our ethical decisions. From the biblical point of view, ethics cannot exist at all apart from their historical setting; ethics cannot be divorced from time. In this respect the eschatological orientation of the New Testament should be taken very seriously, and the consequences which the apostles deduce from it in their ethical commandments. The New Testament is not concerned with abstract principles, nor with dogmatic laws divorced

¹¹ Kirchliche Dogmatik, III, 4, p. 710.

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from time and space; it is concerned with recognizing time soberly, seizing it, "redeeming" it, and acting accordingly in the place and time appointed to us. We need only recall the eschatological instructions of Romans 13: 1 1 ff .; I. Thess. 5: 1 ff ., etc.; also the "house tables" mentioned in Eph. 5:22 ff.; Col. 3:18 ff., etc. This eschatological orientation of the ethics of the New Testament-and the ethical orientation of the eschatology of the New Testament applies also to our decisions when faced by the events of history. Of course, eschatology is not simply history, and history is not simply eschatology. But the light of eschatology illumines faith in history and compels us to shape it accordingly, to decipher the signs of the time and to do what is necessary here and now. Thus the Christian ethic, because it is eschatological, is definitely related to history. It can never be sufficient simply to repeat what was demanded of people in past times and in different places, however well they may have responded to the challenge of that time. It is here and now that we have to fulfill the commandments of the living God. Faith takes that commandment seriously; and for that very reason it strives to fulfill that commandment here and now.

A good illustration of the importance of the historical situation for our ethical decisions is the question of war. We all know the theory of the "just war," and we know that for centuries it has been the classical teaching of the Christian Church about war. Some Christian groups have always been opposed to this teaching, which they considered to be a distortion of God's will. There are other Christians, however, who have no objection to warfare in principle as applied in the past, but who clearly feel that the old categories are no longer applicable to our present historical situation, because in the atomic age the danger of atomic warfare is a complete negation of every form of justice, and because it constitutes a radical menace to the very existence of mankind. It is becoming increasingly clear that today we can no longer simply hand on the traditional, classical formulations and decisions relating to war. They are an absurd anachronism in our present situation. We must seek new ways and new formulations. And that is where the astonishing thing happens for many of us; because we take the new situation seriously, the clear message of Jesus speaks to us afresh. It is not the historical events themselves which give his message this additional force. Nothing in history could ever do that. But Jesus' commandment,

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which had been watered down into abstract terms, becomes strong and powerful when we obediently apply the Gospel to actual life. This is another reason why the historical situation must be taken seriously.

It is one of the strengths of the theology of J. L. Hromádka that he stresses this fact. The slogan "take the historical situation seriously" has become a real ceterum autem of his message, especially during the last decades. In the ecumenical movement today we find hardly a single important theologian who has devoted so much thought to our position in history, and to the meaning of the tremendous changes in church and society. He is therefore criticized for having a seemingly boundless interest in philosophizing and theologizing about history. When reading Hromádka one constantly comes across phrases which indicate a tendency to philosophize about history, such as "we are confronted today by a completely new era in the history of mankind," contemporary events "reflect the deep change, the turning-point which has taken place in the structure of history," "the challenge of the hour," we must examine "the dimensions-of-depth in the course of history," and so on. In addition, if one takes account of the fact that Hromàdka is a pupil of Troeltsch, and that he is clearly influenced by his teacher in spite of being a theologian, the conclusion seems to be clear: Hromádka is a philosopher of history cloaked as a theologian.

In spite of all the apparent evidence for this conclusion, however, it is not justified. A clear distinction must be drawn. The theological fatality of a philosophy of history arises when one transforms history (consciously or unconsciously) into a religious or secular doctrine of salvation, when one ascribes the status of a revelation to historical events, and then turns one's own views of history into an absolute. But this is just what Hromádka does not do. He angrily rejects any attempt to interpret history as Heilsgeschichte or as revelation: "It is not legitimate to regard history and its events as a source of Revelation; I will waste no words on this point."¹² And he is sincere in this. His whole life-work is a protest against everything which tries to bind the gospel to natural factors. The gospel is free, and it liberates. This great certainty shines out of all Hromádka's writings, and not only out of them but also out of his whole life. The gospel frees us from history and from all forms of

¹² "Letter to Karl Barth," Antwort, p. 4.

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philosophy about history which are always tempted to weave the Christian gospel into their theories. But the gospel, the message of Jesus of Nazareth, the Word incarnate of God, "liberates us from history within history, just as it liberates us from death and the grave."¹³

The fact that the Christian gospel is free from history, but at the same time within history and, for history, is perhaps the very heart of Hromádka's theology. It is clearly rooted in Christology, in the gospel of the way to man. Hromádka says that we must obediently occupy the place which the Son of God has occupied for us. He entered earthly history to the full; he therefore cannot be related only to our religious life beyond history, its purification and spiritualization; he must be sought in the middle and in the depth of the reality of history. That is the ultimate meaning of Hromádka's concept of history: the reality of our following Christ. "My concern is to show that the Church of Jesus Christ and its theologians must face history courageously, and must grapple with contemporary realities in all their naked pitilessness. And the purpose of this is not to adapt oneself to history and its changes, for any reason whatever, or to mould theological thought in accordance with history; its purpose is to attain real theological control of any historical situation."¹⁴ And this concern-to take history seriously for the sake of the way of Jesus Christ-must be whole-heartedly approved. So Hromádka is not a philosopher of history in the cloak of a theologian; he is a genuine theologian, though perhaps sometimes in the cloak of a philosopher of history.

III

Although faith takes the events of history seriously, it does not take them with deadly seriousness. For history is also the sphere of "human confusion," and these confusions should not on any account be taken with deadly seriousness. Both facts are stressed in our slogan: history is a human activity, not the work of demons; the power of history is not the power of God nor the power of the devil. It must not be regarded either as divine or as demonic. And history is also the outcome of human confusions; it is not entirely sublime, venerable, or holy. We need not be bewitched or dazzled by the

¹³ "Kirchliche Existenz in der heudgen Situation," Kirche und Verkündigung, p. 15.
¹⁴ Antwort, p. 4.

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course of history. Of course, it does bewitch and dazzle us, filling us now with enthusiastic optimism and now with skeptical defeatism. (Both the concepts of history that we have mentioned may perhaps bear some traces of this). But there is no biblical justification for this attitude. The events of history must be evaluated soberly and realistically.

In concrete terms this means that no historical position must be raised to an absolute. This is true in the first place of our own lives. We are not the prisoners of history, and we must not live as if we were. Our situation in history is the base from which we act. We cannot act from any other position. Yet we are not simply dominated by it. Karl Barth has expressed this in a very apt way: "We must not regard our position in history as our grave, but as our cradle."¹⁵ Our position is not equivalent to our completed vocation; it is a preparation for that vocation. This vocation (the call of the Christian gospel) illumines our history-not vice versa. In this light we recognize our "cradle" as a gift and gratefully accept it. At the same time we realize that it is a task, a point of departure for a life of faith. So the eschatological call first shows us our concrete place in history, and then calls us to move forward from that place, not in order to leave it empty but in order to fill it with the message of Christ, It is the place where we prove ourselves, the place where we make our witness; it is not to be accepted passively, but to be molded actively.

Our position in history must not be turned into an absolute in its relation to our own lives, and even less in relation to the lives of others. This is a constant temptation: to judge others by one's own standards. In a certain sense it is natural; we cannot help thinking and acting from our own point of view. This bias is inevitable when thinking about history, and acting in it. But this situation must be soberly realized. We must not take it for granted as a dogma. We must be ready for genuine encounter and conversation with people in different situations. Otherwise our own view becomes an absolute norm. If we do not remember our own "human confusion," history becomes dehumanized. The sphere of human decisions develops into a battleground for demons; for whenever I turn my personal view into an absolute norm, the other person will be demonized.

¹⁵ Kirchliche Dogmatik, IV, 3/2, p. 714.

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It is of particular importance to recognize this today; it is a particularly acute point of our ethical responsibility in the contemporary world. We are living in the age of the cold war, in a world in which all conceivable means are enlisted (except nuclear warfare which would mean universal suicide) to fight our opponents. It is an age full of divisions and tensions. In this situation even the Christian Church is tempted to adopt the strategy of the cold war. This intensifies the spirit of the cold war, for it is precisely in the religious categories that one's opponent is easily stamped as an adversary of God (i.e., demonized), This is clearly a danger to the spirit of understanding; one cannot negotiate with demons. The difficult, but hopeful, way of negotiation and effort is defamed from the outset as an illusion. Christians must try to counter this tendency. In the world of "human confusion" the struggles are not between angels and demons; they are human tensions. That does not mean that they are innocuous; they go very deep. But they certainly must not be regarded as insuperable. For they are just human tensions. The task of Christian theology is soberly to develop this view of history, to bear witness to it in our ecumenical contacts and in our efforts for peace in the divided world. By carefully listening to one another without concealing the differences between us, and by recognizing the human relativity of our views in the light of the gospel, we shall not only improve the genuineness of ecumenical contacts; we shall also set up a sign of hope and reconciliation for our fellowmen.