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Prof. H. Richard Niebuhr
Yale Divinity School
New Haven II, Conn.

August 14, 1961

Dear Professor Niebuhr:

I want to thank you for your letter and the editors of THEOLOGY TODAY for giving me a chance to reply to it. This gives me a welcome opportunity to apologize for the ease with which I accused you of a lack of scholarship in my review of your book. What I should have made clear is that I wanted to sound a strong protest

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against a certain element of the Enlightenment, namely, its interpretation of "religion," which seems to me unscholarly. I like to use this strong term in order to draw attention to the ironical fact that rationalism does not always mean respect for reason. To reduce a phenomenon which announces itself as religion to something which is not-religion, for example, to an -ism or to group life, seems to me to show a disrespect for reason and scholarship. Scholarship implies taking seriously the phenomenon we study. Behind my protest is also a moral element. Who gives us the right to apply this condescending reduction to the profound religions of Egypt, of old Babylon, of ancient Greece, or of the primitives?

Thus, what I try to fight is a structure of thinking related to the Enlightenment. Of course, we are all of us children of the Enlightenment. Of course we all of us enjoy the many benefits of that way of thinking and being. But it seems to me a very simple thing to hope that present-day theologians will extricate themselves from the unfortunate reduction mentality of this same Enlightenment. It is my impression that you have not dissociated yourself clearly from that point of view.

I realize that one of the main points of your letter is the contention that my criticism is out of place because you did not want to offer a "theory of religion." I do not quite understand your point. Are not the following elements basic in your book: (1) an interpretation of religion in terms of polytheism, henotheism, and monotheism? (2) an important aspect of Bergson's interpretation of religion? (3) a basic thesis of the positivistic, sociological theory of religion by Durkheim? Further, your distinction between "faith" and "religion" seems to me a distinction made within the realm of what is mostly called religion. It is on the basis of this theory of religion (related to the Enlightenment and to Positivism) that you offer a discussion of nationalism, totalitarianism, racism, etc. In other words, you offer an analysis of contemporary pseudo-religions in terms of overt religions. If one assumes that this procedure (the "in terms of") is legitimate, one should see to it that one's theory of overt religions is satisfactory.

My objection against this basic element of your thought is not only that it is still too much in the grip of an Enlightenment interpretation of religion, but also that you treat this basic element too casually. The point I would like to make is: you not only have the

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right to offer a theory of religion, but you have the opportunity and it is to your advantage to do so. No one can write clearly about a topic like yours without first making quite clear to himself and to his readers what is his understanding of the phenomenon of religion, that is, without giving his view of the phenomenology of religion. I want to add immediately: the same requirement holds for several other theological disciplines, such as, Biblical studies, philosophy of religion, and those sections of systematic and applied theology which deal with man and his culture.

Of course, the above implies the assertion that modern phenomenology of religion (as contrasted with the old history of religions which sometimes tended to reduce Bible to Babel) is an exceedingly important theological discipline which deserves much more attention than it receives (the work done during the last fifty years in Holland and Scandinavia especially; people like Mircea Eliade; W. Brede Kristensen's The Meaning of Religion). It seems to me that a discussion between Biblical scholars, theologians, philosophers, and phenomenologists is required, for example, to try to bring some order into the confused discussion of "myth" and the Bible. How can one sensibly support or fight the demythologizing of the Bible if one still labors with an obsolete concept of myth?

However, all this talk about theological disciplines does not yet touch the heart of the matter. In inviting us to dissociate ourselves from rationalistic and positivistic treatments of ancient and primitive religions, the modern phenomenology of religion suggests a revision of our understanding of man, that is, of ourselves. It is this suggestion which makes phenomenology so exciting.

Quite another issue is the argument about "being." There is much more to it than the question whether the impersonal and unhistorical deity of Plato, called "Being," is compatible with the personal, historical God of the Bible, the Father of Jesus Christ. I am disturbed by the fact that you consider Etienne Gilson as an ally on such a crucial point. Of course, Gilson is an eminent scholar, an erudite historian of medieval theology and philosophy. If one wants to know how and to what extent "Scholastic A" influenced "Scholastic B," Gilson is our man. But if one theologizes, and one is a Protestant, let us keep him at as remote a distance as possible. I believe I have very good reasons for this harsh judgment.

The book you quote is Gilson's Spirit of Medieval Philosophy.

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One. day I happened to consult another of his works, the History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, on Aquinas' notion of the proper name of God. At the moment of writing this letter, this volume is not available to me, hence I have to paraphrase by memory. Gilson's discussion of Aquinas' view of Ex. 3: 14 runs somewhat as follows:

The proper name of God is "I am who I am" according to Ex. 3: 14. The problem is: what is the interpretation of this text? What modern philologists offer does not amount to a clear picture. Therefore we may ignore their opinions and must ask what meaning the Christian masters have attributed to this famous text. Most of them agree that it meant: " I am Being."

I cannot help writhing or bristling at such a procedure. As a Protestant I want to theologize in such a manner that the Gospel is protected against all attempts to subsume the Bible under the Tradition. Calling myself a Liberal (with some reservations) means for me not to side with Schleiermacher and against Barth (I admire that man very much), but to fight against a powerful tendency to fit Biblical texts either in a system of theological doctrines (like so many Roman Catholics and orthodox Protestants) or in a metaphysical system (Roman Catholics and some Liberals), without making sure that the meaning of the Biblical text is not violated by such a procedure. Being a Liberal means for me to recognize that there are many texts in the Bible the meaning of which is not clear, and many others the meaning of which is disturbing for the theology which we adhere to. I am vehemently opposed to any attempt to minimize the difficulty in which such texts place us. The Bible is full of nuts which are hard to crack, full of disturbing facts, full of unpalatable ideas. We should leave those things alone, and not try to clothe those bare, embarrassing facts with the enchanting dress of a Thomistic, Calvinistic, Kantian, or Kierkegaardian theology. As an intellectual I demand respect for each discipline. Each branch of study has the right to be heard and not to be put on a side track in favor of a beloved tradition or system. For me this is simply a matter of intellectual honesty and integrity, or respect for human reason. Again, it is instructive to notice how rationalism does not always mean respect for human reason!

Of course, it would be boorish to accuse Gilson of dishonesty. For him things look quite different. For a Catholic it is quite clear

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that we have to listen to the voice of God if it speaks powerfully in the Tradition of the Church, especially if the fallible voice of mere human scholarship speaks hesitantly. But for me (please notice that I do not say for the Protestant), for the kind of Protestant, for the kind of Liberal I am, this whole procedure is atrocious, repulsive.

Finally, I am quite ready to admit that one cannot disqualify all attempts by Protestants to fuse God with Plato's deity "Being," by pointing out the questionable method used by one scholar, in one paragraph, in one book. Still, I am not quite sure whether much Protestant metaphysical theology, either openly or quite naively, uses methods such as Gilson's: taking too lightly what the Bible says, and following too easily the authority of well-rounded metaphysical or theological systems.

I want to thank you for listening patiently to my perhaps too impetuous protestations.

Cordially,

Prof. Willem F. Zuurdeeg
McCormick Theological Seminary
Chicago 14, Ill.