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The Great Economic Debate: An Ethical Analysis
By J. Philip Wogaman
Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1977. 182 pp. $5.95.
This book reminds us once again that Philip Wogaman deserves our appreciation for keeping his eyes on fundamental social issues. This is especially so at a time when so many ethicists are withdrawing into increasingly abstract topics or gravitating to more profitable and popular issues such as medical and business ethics. Wogaman stands out among those who still think ethics should have something to contribute to the public debate on such difficult but basic issues as economic organization.
In attempting to enter the debate among economic ideologies, Wogaman sets out four tasks for himself: (1) to establish that economics is properly a matter of ideology as well as fact, (2) to consider what moral values can guide our economics, (3) to identify the strengths and weaknesses of five representative ideologies, and (4) to reach some conclusions about what ideologies are most adequate. As always, he sets about these tasks very straightforwardly, and he accomplishes some quite well.
Wogaman begins with a quote from Walter Rauschenbusch. He then suggests that stagflation, multi-national corporations, and resource limitation are forcing us to discover that economics is not morally neutral. What was it Rauschenbusch discovered anyway? What we might usually pass over as just another case of the historical forgetfulness we all share in from time to time is especially significant in this case. Economic ideology is an important issue not because we have recently discovered it but because it is an issue at the very core of
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the modern human predicament which we periodically rediscover and ignore only at great human cost.
Wogaman proceeds to develop a very creative understanding of ideology as a complex weaving together of facts and values in an integrated pattern capable of directing choices. By seeing an ideology as a presumption open to evidence and argument rather than a closed system, he suggests a much more dynamic concept of ideology than is often used. On this basis he contends that ideology cannot and should not be avoided-that thoughtful people need presumptions. In the process he rejects both capitalist and socialist attempts to argue for a purely scientific economics. Likewise he discards the mere pragmatism of middle class America as simple ignorance of its own presumptions. He concludes by suggesting that ideologies must be judged both in terms of their value bases and their achievements in fact.
Having set the scene by arguing that economics must involve ideology, Wogaman moves to his second task-the consideration of appropriate moral values. He begins by expressing limited appreciation for John Rawl's ethics and the theology of revolution. Those flanks covered, he attempts to formulate a Christian perspective on economics. By way of a survey of divine grace, ultimate human kinship, the necessary balance of the material and spiritual, and human sin, he settles on five ethical criteria for an adequate ideology: (1) that it take material well-being seriously, (2) that it uphold the basic unity of the human family, (3) that it value individuality, (4) that it stress equality over inequality, and (5) that it recognize human sin. It should be noted that these criteria are all value considerations developed without reference to the facts of our economic life. Wogaman cannot judge the achievements in fact of ideologies on purely theological grounds. As we shall see, he never develops any other grounds.
With these five criteria in mind, Wogaman proceeds to the third task-the review and evaluation of five ideological positions: Marxism, capitalism, social market capitalism, democratic socialism, and economic conservationism. The fifth, which is Wogaman's attempt to pay due respect to Schumacher and the like, never quite qualifies as a full ideology. Rather it dissolves under analysis into an appropriate concern for limited resources, the wholeness of life, and human values-a concern which any of the other four ought to take seriously.
The four that remain can be grouped into the extreme left, the extreme right, and the two in the middle. Actually the cardinal criterion of judgment turns out to be some balance between individual freedom and social equality. Given the abstractness of this principle the result is quite predictable if somewhat disappointing. While expressing some appreciation for its concept of alienation, Wogaman rejects Marxist ideology for downplaying individual responsibility and freedom. While crediting capitalism with recognizing the value of economic freedom, of creativity, and of private consumption, he rejects it for being ultimately based on individual selfishness. In sum, since
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freedom and equality are both essential, he eliminates Marxism for sacrificing freedom to equality, and capitalism for sacrificing equality to freedom.
That leaves us with two ideologies, both of which claim to balance equality and freedom. In the final analysis, it also leaves Wogaman silent. Both have their strengths, a market mechanism which has performed well in the case of social market capitalism and high principles which are largely untested in the case of democratic socialism. Both have their problems. However, in the end, while Wogaman expresses a personal preference for democratic socialism, his criteria cannot make such fine distinctions. We are left reassured that at least a debate between these two alternatives is a giant step in the right direction from the current muddled compromise between capitalism and social market capitalism. We are tempted to agree, but somehow it seems that all this ethical analysis should provide some greater guidance for choice.
Any evaluation of Wogaman's work must first recognize both the immensity and the value of this inquiry. Wogaman has made a solid case for the validity of ethical inquiry into economic ideologies. While some experts might raise questions about fine points, he has done an admirable job of detailing each position. His interpretation of the Christian faith is quite well done. The major problem that remains is Wogaman's inability to distinguish very sharply between social market capitalism and democratic socialism.
But does not Wogaman's own definition of ideology as a complex interweaving of facts and values indicate a direction he might have taken which could have shed light on this problem? Does this not suggest that a careful analysis of the specific interweaving of fact and value typical of each ideological position could profitably precede theological reflection and the development of ethical criteria? Then the issue of economic ideology would pose problems for theological reflection which in turn should lead to criteria capable of discriminating more effectively among idealogies. Indeed, Wogaman used just such a method quite fruitfully in his Guaranteed Annual Income: The Moral Issues. Without such prior analysis his theological ethics never quite brings fact and value into dialogue, making concrete choice very difficult.
All of this does not detract from the importance of this work. Rather it is precisely because it opens up such rich material in such a fruitful way that it raises basic questions about the purpose and character of ethical choice. It is just that dialogue which Wogaman seeks to provoke. He does so quite effectively.
Warren R. Copeland
Wittenberg University
Springfield, Ohio