Theology Today - Vol 38, No. 3 - October 1981 - ARTICLE - Freedom and the Lutheran Reformation

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Freedom and the Lutheran Reformation
By Wolfhart Parmenberg

"The impact of the Reformation on the course of modern culture is far more evident in the perspective opened by the issue of freedom than in entering into the technicalities of the doctrine of justification. "

CELEBRATING the Reformation is not the same today as it was in former centuries-like in 1817, 1830, or even in 1930. In the perspective of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Reformation had been victorious in the course of modern history. The Roman Catholic Church, apparently, had been left behind as a medieval petrifact, and a modern culture inspired, by the Protestant spirit seemed on the ascent and destined to spread all over the world.

After two world wars and in a period of Western decadence, the picture now looks different. The cultural and political systems created in the wake of the Reformation have disintegrated or suffer from serious problems. The formative cultural impact of Protestant Christianity is weakened, and instead a new sensitivity and appreciation of church unity has emerged in connection with the ecumenical movement. The Roman Catholic Church, after appropriating a number of old Protestant criticisms, especially in the area of liturgical life, presents herself once more as an attractive model for the unity of all Christians.

If we celebrate the Reformation in such a context, there is no warrant for chauvinistic Protestant triumphalism, nor should we indulge in denominational parochialism. Rather we should remind ourselves of the fact that the Reformation did not start as a sectarian movement but as a reform of the entire "catholic" church, for restoration to the authentic spirit of apostolic origins. It is in this perspective that we remember today the Augsburg Confession of 1530 and the subsequent negotiations struggling for the preservation of Christian unity. In view of the subsequent divisions of Western Christianity and of the disastrous wars which resulted from the failure of early attempts at reconciliation, there

Wolfhart Parmenberg is Professor of Theology at the University of Munich. He has been a frequent lecturer in America, for example at Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and Claremont. Dr. Pannenberg is the author of Theology and the Kingdom of God (1969), The Idea of God and Human Freedom (1973), and Theology and the Philosophy of Science (1976). We are publishing this essay in our October issue because the theme corresponds with the celebration of Reformation Day, Oct. 31.

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are reasons for repentance not only on the Roman Catholic side, but also on the Protestant Lutheran side.

The historical consequences of the Reformation have been in the main part unintended and unwanted, such as the division of Western Christianity, a long period of cruel and bloody wars, and finally the emancipation of modern culture from its Christian roots, a process we call secularization. In the Lutheran community we would be well advised to appreciate the peace-minded prudence and presentiment of Philipp Melanchthon more than in the past, when some of his actions and statements in 1530 were considered disloyal to the principles of the Reformation and to the truth of the gospel itself.

At present, we do not know whether the spirit of repentance will become strong enough on both sides so as to overcome the denominational barriers that separate us. There is, however, a new sense of ecumenical fellowship arising throughout the Christian churches. In Protestantism, there is a new appreciation of many elements of the Catholic tradition, such as frequent and regular celebration of the eucharist. But there are also concerns of the Reformation that cannot be surrendered without jeopardizing the Christian authenticity we all seek.

One of the most important of these basic Protestant concerns is Luther's discovery and reinterpretation of the Christian idea of freedom. In the New Testament writings, freedom enjoyed a prominent place in the theologies of both Paul and John. But later on, it almost fell into oblivion because freedom, or liberty, came to mean something else, namely the capacity to choose and to act as one wants. Luther fought passionately against this formalistic and superficial concept of freedom, because the profound notion of freedom as taught by the apostles Paul and John was at the very heart of the gospel as he understood it.

In Luther's perspective, the notion of Christian freedom was equivalent to justification by faith. When in 1520 Luther made his final attempt to communicate the core of Protestant doctrine directly to Pope Leo X, he called his little treatise Of Christian Freedom (De libertate christiana).

There are additional considerations, however, which suggest that the central doctrine of the Reformation should be discussed under the heading of liberty rather than of justification. It is obvious that the impact of the Reformation on the course of modern culture is far more evident in the perspective opened by the issue of freedom than in entering into the technicalities of the doctrine of justification. And it seems to me that especially the continuing contribution of Lutheran doctrine to the social and political context of our time, as well as to the ecumenical situation of contemporary Christianity, can be more effectively articulated in the language of freedom and liberty than in the traditional language of the doctrine of justification.

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In talking about the difficulties involved in the terminology of justification, I do not question the content of the doctrine of justification by faith. To the contrary, I want that content to be set free from the shell of an opaque and barren language. Certainly that language is hallowed by tradition, but it is not very effective today in communicating its content.

In the New Testament, the term justification occurs only in rare cases outside the Pauline epistles, and even there it is almost absent from the two letters to the Corinthians. It occurs mainly in Romans and Galatians where Paul stresses the difference of Christian faith from traditional Jewish piety: "Now it is evident that no man is justified before God by the law; for 'He who through faith is righteous shall live' " (Gal. 3:11). The notion of justification by faith was coined in a polemical situation, and it served a similar function later on in Lutheran criticism of late medieval works-righteousness. The emphasis is on the crucial importance of faith in the life of the Christian. But what is obtained by faith can be expressed in different ways as well, for example, through faith we have communion with God, peace with God, therefore forgiveness of sins, freedom, and life beyond death.

But there are difficulties with the concept of justification. In ordinary language, we "justify" ourselves against charges that have been brought against us. We may also be justified by those who explain the behavior of the accused and argue for their innocence. In any event, the use of the term "justification" makes sense only in relation to some charge of offense or fault, and that is precisely where problems lurk.

In Christian conscience, it may seem to be a fair description of the human condition that every one stands as a sinner, as offender in the court of the divine law. On such an assumption, it makes sense to speak of justification. But this is not the way human beings generally regard themselves in our culture. Today the basic assumption is that we all have a right to exist and to realize our own potential. The language of freedom, therefore, is much more effective in expressing the relation of the Christian message with basic human aspirations.

The demands of a divine law are no longer taken for granted, in general, and much less so is the statement of the universal human failure to comply with such demands. Hence the need for justification is not felt as a basic problem of human existence, and therefore the term justification does not easily communicate the Christian message to people today.

In the Reformation that was quite different. The public consciousness of late medieval piety was based on a general knowledge of the divine law and of its demands, and beyond that there was an awareness of human failure and of the threat of eternal judgment. It made sense, then, to focus upon the question whether human beings can deal with that situation on the basis of their own efforts or whether they have to despair of their own possibilities and to rely upon something else. In the course of modern culture, the frame of reference has changed. Ac-

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knowledgment of the divine law and awareness of human failure and of an impending divine judgment are no longer common. Therefore, the language of the doctrine of justification no longer seems to answer the spiritual need of our time. It may still be a correct doctrine, but it does not speak to the human heart, unless special individual conditions or special instruction are given.

One could answer this critique by arguing that admittedly there is a basic psychological need for being accepted, and that justification simply means to be accepted by God. Now there is indeed a human need for being accepted, and it may be more acutely felt in our culture than in other cultures because of the insecurity of many individuals in relation to their social context. But acceptance is not equivalent to justification. Although justification, if successful, results in acceptance, justification's distinctive presupposition is being charged with an offense. Justification against a charge can result in acceptance, if the plea for justification is deemed successful. Thus we realize that there is a much broader meaning to acceptance, and it represents a much more basic phenomenon in human life. While we always need acceptance, the need for justification in view of charges brought against us is a more exceptional case.

At this point another difficulty arises concerning the concept of justification. Hitherto we were concerned with problems resulting from the change of the cultural situation, a change that renders the language of this central doctrine of the Lutheran Reformation opaque, but does not touch upon its intrinsic correctness. Yet there are also difficulties concerning the intelligibility of the traditional concept of justification by faith.

In the situation of being charged with certain offenses, justification aims at demonstrating the innocence of the accused. Accused persons may justify themselves or may be justified by somebody else. Justification always amounts to excuse. But the theological doctrine of justification does not mean to say that the accused one is not guilty of the offense, but it wants to say that the offense is forgiven. It is a rather paradoxical use of the notion of justification. But one takes refuge in paradox only in case a need is so pressing that it cannot be avoided. The need for justification may be answered in such an extraordinary way, if a more ordinary solution is not available. But is this still our situation concerning justification? Does not the paradoxical structure of the theological doctrine of justification rather discourage the effort to understand?

In ordinary language, in seeking justification one presupposes the accused one to be innocent and the charges to be wrong. In theology, justification means that the accused one is only becoming innocent by the act of justification itself, equivalent to forgiveness of sins. And the charges are not wrong. They are only removed in consequence of a change that is taking place in the person of the accused one who is set

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right by an act of divine grace that may be identical or not with remission of sins. The Latin word iustificare may have suggested such an interpretation since its literal meaning is "to make just," but that is contrary to ordinary usage. In short, there are not only problems of cultural change, but also intrinsic problems in the theological concept of justification as coined in the Reformation, and these problems contribute to the widespread feeling that the doctrine of justification is difficult to understand.

The point of the Lutheran doctrine does not so much depend on the notion of justification as has been often assumed. Prominent as the question for justification certainly was in Luther's mind, his argument depends primarily on the notion of faith. Therefore, in his treatise On Christian Liberty, Luther could explain his doctrine by treating extensively the peculiar nature and power of faith, Luther's new concept of faith was in fact his most important and imperishable contribution to theology. And from this angle the doctrine of justification is perfectly intelligible.

According to Luther, faith puts us outside ourselves. What Luther in his later years said of theology, is primarily true of his concept of faith: it seizes us and puts us outside ourselves, lest we rely upon our own power, conscience, perception, person and works, and it makes us rely upon that which is outside ourselves, namely, upon God's promise [ ... rapit nos a nobis et ponit nos extra nos, ut non nitarnur viribus, conscientia, sensu, persona, operibus nostris, sed eo nitamur, quod est extra nos WA 40/1, 589, 25].

There is an element of "ecstasis" in the act of faith. We literally leave ourselves to the one to whom we completely entrust ourselves. This ecstatic nature of faith is presupposed in Luther's recurrent affirmations that through faith we participate in Christ and, indeed, in God-in the divine life and spirit and grace. Therefore, through faith we also participate in the righteousness of Christ, and his righteousness becomes our own, although it remains outside ourselves, because it is only in faith that it is ours. Thus justification by faith is only one example-although a particularly important one-of how we participate through faith in everything that belongs to Christ or to God. The entire argument, then, depends on the understanding of the nature of faith.

Luther developed a radically new interpretation of faith, and the full range of it was little understood even among his early followers. In medieval theology, faith meant assent to the doctrine of the church, an assent, to be sure, that must be motivated by love of God in order to have salvific effect. Luther not only added the notion of trust, but he wanted to emphasize that the personal center itself changes in the act of trust, because the trusting person surrenders to the one in whom such

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confidence is entrusted. The point was crucial in Luther's argument, but difficult to grasp. Even his friends did not fully understand his intuition at this point.

Melanchthon appropriated the interpretation of faith in terms of personal trust, and he often argued that trust is the only adequate way of responding to a promise. But Melanchthon did not grasp Luther's profound insight that faith by way of ecstasis participates in the reality of Christ himself and therefore transforms the faithful into Christ's image. Consequently, in Melancbthon's theology justification remained somewhat wooden, juridical matter, while in Luther's language it bad mystical flavor.

Calvin, in this respect, came closer to Luther's thought since he spoke of a spiritual unity with Christ in the act of faith. But even Calvin did not realize that the very foundation of the traditional concept of a personal self was shaken by Luther's discovery concerning the nature of faith.

III

Luther's new concept of faith not only epitomized the theological program of the Reformation, for it implied a new anthropological vision, a new idea of the human person. Even today, its prophetic potential is not exhausted. Lutherans should make use of this insight in reassessing the human condition, concerning the quest for personal identity, and also concerning the context of modern society and the task of restructuring the life of the church.

The broad significance of Luther's concept of faith becomes particularly evident in relation to his idea of Christian freedom. According to Luther, the justice that is obtained by faith is equivalent to freedom. It means liberation from the bondage of sin and symbolizes a personal identity based on our accordance with God's will for the creature. Following the teachings of the apostles Paul and John, Luther was deeply convinced that there can be no true freedom as long as the human person is enslaved by the power of sin. But since in ourselves we are sinful creatures, it is only in the act of faith in God and in Christ that we can be liberated, because faith puts us outside ourselves, extra nos in Christ. And because we acquire freedom only in Christ, there can be no natural freedom or liberty, according to Luther.

Luther did not deny human ability to make choices, but he did not want to call that freedom. Even if the human will is perfectly free in making choices, that agency itself is enslaved by sin, because the will seeks a personal good, puts the self always in the center. Since the will is already structured in this way, we are no longer free to choose to be or not to be a sinner. Even if we choose the way of righteousness, it is in our sinful perspective that we choose so. This is the bondage of the will in our natural human condition. The formal freedom of making choices is no real freedom. If we call it "free will," that is an empty name, a res de solo titulo, as Luther said in 1518.

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Luther was the first critic of freedom, long before Marx. And he was far more radical in his criticism. While Marx shared the assumption of modern political thought, epitomized in Rousseau's world that we are born free, although we are in chains everywhere, Luther as well as the Johannine Christ denied the assumption of natural freedom, and that is the necessary complement of Luther's thesis that authentic freedom is obtained only by faith in Christ. Freedom is not a primordial property of human nature, but it is the peak of human destiny, and it is only in Christ that we find our authentic self, our true destiny. This thesis has far reaching consequences not only for the life of the individual person, but also for social and political life. While modern society has been built on the assumption that all human beings are equally free by nature, the authentic view of the Lutheran Reformation is that human persons are neither free nor equal by nature, but only by destiny. They are equal before God as they all may acquire and enjoy their freedom in Christ. The meaning of justification by faith is that there is no true freedom except by faith in Christ. The contrast and the challenge to the dominant trend in the develop ment of modern thought and of modern society is obvious here as soon as one penetrates through the apparent idiosyncrasy of the linguistic shell of the doctrine. Few Christians have dared to realize the full consequences of that doctrine, especially the social and political conse quences. To build a society according to these standards of liberty and equality would not allow for religious neutrality of the state nor for individual caprice as the measure of freedom. But while it would respect individual conscience, it would be so designed as to expose individuals to the claims of their authentic freedom and allow them to live out its consequences. Luther may have intended such a thing in his attempts at distinguishing and relating the two kingdoms, although he never really faced the task of restructuring the social system itself on the basis of his theological vision.

The Reformation has often been regarded as the source of the modern concept of freedom and of the reconstruction of society. Unfortunately, this judgment is only partly true. In many ways, in the perspective of the Lutheran Reformation, modern liberalism cannot be spared the charge of having perverted the Christian idea of freedom. While Luther fought against the opinion that the exercise of choice already amounts to freedom, the liberal idea of natural freedom reverted to that opinion and consequently tends to mistake license for freedom.

Liberalism underestimates that, beyond formal choice, the idea of freedom imports the subject of personal identity. This is one reason why societies built on liberal principles suffer from a widespread experience of meaninglessness and lack of purpose in individual life, although the advertising agencies of the consumer society do their best to fill that

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gap. Even worse is the tendency to portray mere choice as if it were already the fulfillment of freedom in the more profound sense of the word.

But precisely at this point one has also to acknowledge the element of truth in the position that derives the modern principles of political freedom from the Reformation. Without freedom of choice, the quest for personal identity is impaired, and faith as personal commitment is hampered. Although mere choice is not yet the full-fledged realization of human freedom, still it is a necessary formal condition of it. Therefore the constitutional protection of individual freedom of choice has a legitimate claim to having achieved a degree of political realization of the Reformation principle of Christian freedom. There were good reasons for Hegel's sensible statement in his Philosophy of History that the confidence of being united to God lies at the basis of the modern principle of individual freedom. The crux is, however, that in the perspective of the Lutheran Reformation being united to God happens extra nos in faith, while the modern spirit increasingly came to believe that the aspirations of the natural individual as such are legitimate expressions of absolute truth.

For better or for worse, it was not the Lutheran Reformation that brought about the movement toward the political realization of the new principle of Christian freedom. Lutheranism never faced the task of a complete reconstruction of the political system. It is possible to argue that this belongs to the essence of Lutheranism, and certainly Luther rejected the vision of the Peasant's revolution of building a political order on the basis of the Sermon on the Mount. But it is possible to argue that in Lutheran territories the need and responsibility for a complete renewal of the social system did not arise in a way comparable to the situation in the Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century or Britain two generations later. In any event, this task was left to Calvinism. The correspondence between Christian freedom and republican liberties had been felt by Calvin himself, and in distinction from Luther he was suspicious in principle of monarchical rule. But it was only when, contrary to Calvin, the idea of toleration in the Netherlands was combined with civil liberty that the pressures for creating a society on the basis of civil liberty were felt, a development that John Milton would later call the reformation of Reformation itself.

Ernst Troeltsch regarded the Calvinist transition from Christian freedom to political liberty as much more influential in the history of modern culture than the Lutheran tradition. Troeltsch's judgment seems fair enough, and Lutherans, especially in America, should consider it worthwhile to reflect on the question why the Lutheran Reformation fell behind, leaving it to Calvinism to champion the principle of political freedom.

One reason was certainly the doctrine of "the two kingdoms," but that doctrine could have been regarded as a first attempt at relating political ethics to the new insights of the Reformation rather than as a final answer to these questions. It remains deplorable that the Lutheran

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perspective was not brought to bear more effectively upon the process of designing the foundations of a liberal society. The keen awareness of the difference between true freedom and mere choice or license, an awareness that distinguishes the Lutheran spirit, could have helped to guard modern society against the dangers of isolating the principle of formal freedom so as to let it constitute alone the basis of the social system.

Perhaps the Lutheran Reformation could still provide resources for a correction of the design of Western society on the basis of the principle, of political freedom. Such a correction, however, is not yet achieved through limiting the exercise of formal freedom by social responsibility. It had to take into account the religious factor in the individual search for human identity and in the unity of a culture. In order to overcome the lack of purpose and meaning that is felt by so many people in Western societies, the significance of religion for the human person has to be taken more seriously than was done since the confessional wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and since the beginning of secularization.

The Lutheran spirit does not favor the ideal of a theocratic society in the fashion of early Calvinism or Puritanism. The Lutheran tradition does not know of a sacred law that regenerated Christians must observe. But neither can Lutheran freedom by faith in Christ remain unconcerned about the social world and its relation to religion. A quietistic attitude to matters of this world is but a deformation of the Lutheran extra nos. To be united with Christ by faith entails participation in service to the world. This was pointed out in the second part of Luther's treatise On Christian Liberty.

It depends on individual calling and circumstance what particular form such service may take. But there is not only a spectrum of services within a given order of society, but also a service to the social order as such so that its promotion of the conditions of life in this world may contribute to the personal freedom and identity that can be obtained only by faith in Christ. The present political order in Western societies does a poor job in this respect. More is needed to help people answer for themselves the question of meaning for their lives. Therefore the religious question is of public significance. Public recognition of the significance of religion for the cultural unity of society and for the personal identity of citizens, however, is possible only on one condition. Religion must not resist the spirit of pluralism. The monolithic dogmatism of traditional forms of Christianity has been the single most important reason to exclude religion from the public realm and to reduce it to a matter of private concern. If religion is to regain public authority, it has to appropriate the spirit of pluralism without losing its identity.

It is at this point that I envision the possible contribution of the Lutheran idea of Christian freedom to the ecumenical situation of contemporary Christianity. On what basis can we accept Christians

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from other traditions who adhere to different doctrines and churches? This crucial question of the modern ecumenical dialogue is certainly a far cry from Luther's thought.

The Lutheran insistence on pure doctrine was as monolithic as anything at that time. There was no room for doctrinal pluralism. And yet, it was not by chance that the principle of Christian freedom favored in the long run a more pluralistic and tolerant attitude even in questions of doctrine. The reason is that the principle of Christian freedom embodies the spirit of immediacy to Christ on the part of the individual believer, and therefore it entails a necessity for personal judgment on matters of authoritative doctrine. Such a critical judgment of the individual conscience may not enjoy the public authority in the church that belongs to its special ministry. Nevertheless, the principle of Christian freedom entitles Christians to their own personal judgment in matters of faith. This entails a pluralistic situation within the church concerning questions of doctrine on the local level of the life of the church as well as on the regional and universal level. The diverse ways of personally expressing the faith, however, need not prevent a consciousness of being united in that faith itself, nor do they exclude a public ministry, the responsibility of which is to coordinate and integrate the different and sometimes contradictory individual articulations into the unity of the one faith.

It is precisely the pluralism of interpretations and attitudes arising with the principle of Christian freedom that renders such a coordinating and integrating ministry necessary. Such a ministry of unity on all levels of the life of the church has been but poorly developed in Protestant Christianity, and the Lutheran churches are no exception here. While on the local level, the pastor' sometimes retains too much of an almost monarchical position, on the regional and on the universal levels the function of taking care of the unity of the church in the faith of the Apostles is underdeveloped. But the unity of the church is a constitutive element in the authentic faith of each individual Christian, and public ministry has a legitimate claim to public authority in the church on questions of doctrine, notwithstanding the right of the individual believer to personal judgement.

The Lutheran Reformation did not realize the seriousness of this matter. The reason is that unanimity in questions of doctrine was still considered to be a normal thing in the church. Since, however, pluralism, even in questions of doctrine, has become more fully apparent as a consequence of the principle of Christian freedom, the importance of the ministry for church unity on every level of the church's life has increased. And this is not only a problem of external organization, but it is a question of the faith itself, because the unity of the body of Christ is part and parcel of the Christian identity of each individual Christian.

In these matters, contemporary Lutheranism has to learn a new lesson from the Roman and Orthodox Catholic churches. Church unity is essential in the Christian authenticity of each individual Christian.

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Correspondingly, we need a new awareness of the function of ministry in the life of the church. But on the other hand, the tendency toward hierarchical authority in the clergy must not overrule, but respect the immediacy to Christ that each individual Christian enjoys through faith and the consequent autonomy of individual judgment even in spiritual matters. The importance of the individual conscience of every Christian in the life of the church, in consequence of the principle of Christian freedom, belongs to the permanent contribution of the Lutheran Refor mation to the Christian heritage and should be incorporated in any new form of church unity.